This story illustrates the problem with the ill-defined boundary of 
applicability of 'vague' terms like 'thought' (and 'information processing' 
as applied to brains) - neural restructuring perhaps including 
weaker-synapse pruning during sleep is likely to have played a key role in 
enabling Poincare's brain to reframe the problem, and maybe that was all 
that was needed to make the final step macro-consciously at the bus stop; I 
am not sure I would call this sleep episode 'thought' (the same applies to 
any other non-dream sleeping brain activity), but 'information processing' 
at the micro-level (say massively parallel neurotransmitter activity) might 
just be defensible as a rough description of the neural restructuring and 
other relevant micro-events. I don't know how a substantially higher level 
information processing model will help even if it were possible - back to 
precisifying the terms used again.

Perhaps the basic question hinges on whether appropriately organised brain 
activity that constitutes 'thought' was necessary to reframe or prepare the 
problem for solving, at some stage during the prior weeks.

Alastair


On Monday, February 23, 2026 at 10:54:46 PM UTC Brent Meeker wrote:

> That's why I referred to *information processing* as a broader term 
> subsuming conscious thought.  I assume you are familiar with Poincare's 
> account of how a the solution to a mathematical problem suddenly came to 
> him as he was about to step onto a bus, even though he hadn't thought about 
> it (consciously) for weeks.  
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 2/23/2026 12:08 AM, Alastair wrote:
>
> Just to clarify, my 'extended' version of physicalism isn't intended to 
> replace the standard version, which accepts the existence of elementary 
> particles, the Big Bang etc (QM is a more complicated and partly unsettled 
> issue). It just focusses on certain forms of brain activity corresponding 
> to thoughts.
>
> If meaning is given by common use, then 'thought' - not a technical term - 
> is confined to awake humans (and perhaps their dreams, and conceivably also 
> a few other creatures) . . . for now. Meanings can change over time.
>
> Alastair  
>
>
> On Saturday, February 21, 2026 at 10:46:21 PM UTC Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> A lot of biological information isn't even instantiated in neuronal 
>> activity, it's in one's "gut" metaphorically speaking.
>>
>> I seems to me that a common mistake in idealism is to take consciousness 
>> as the whole of thought.  Yet we know that (c.f. Poincare') most thought is 
>> unconscious information processing.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> On 2/21/2026 2:16 AM, Alastair wrote:
>>
>> Most of this is fascinating, insightful and deep - from what I can 
>> understand of Parts I to IV. (I am wondering: did you have more than 
>> cosmetic help from AI?)
>>
>> I would also be interested to know your definition of 'information' (as 
>> bitstrings or equivalent? or as their chosen interpretation? or something 
>> else?). Semantic imprecision can be a barrier to adequate understanding and 
>> agreement in these (and many other) kinds of situation, so good definitions 
>> are important.
>>
>> My own preferred version of physicalism has thought events as mass neural 
>> events and so can include ideas, concepts etc, including thoughts in and 
>> about a language, any of which could in theory be correct or incorrect (the 
>> physical laws underpinning those events operate correctly regardless). It 
>> would not appear to fall foul of any of the criticisms in part I of the 
>> article if these are framed outside the context of information as being 
>> ontologically primary; ie from this point of view physicalism is 
>> self-consistent, in this version of it at least, and so contradicts the 
>> assertion that ontologically primary information is the only 
>> self-consistent position available. 
>>
>> We may well have already detected electrical signals corresponding to 
>> thoughts and could even one day decode them, if we can for example 
>> individualise them to key neurons or assemblies and then bulk-analyse them 
>> across macro-time; but I don't understand sufficiently to say whether or 
>> not this this would refute the idea that information is ontologically 
>> primary - this brings us back to the definition of information used, and 
>> perhaps also to that of 'computational structures'. 
>>
>> Alastair
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 15, 2026 at 8:52:30 AM UTC Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> Hello everyone,
>>>
>>> I’m sharing the continuation of The Sapiens Attractor.
>>>
>>> If you’re interested in the deeper structure behind the idea, you can 
>>> read it here:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://allcolor.medium.com/the-sapiens-attractor-maximal-informational-realism-and-the-god-loop-26393e34fa46
>>>
>>> Hope you’ll enjoy it.
>>> Best,
>>> Quentin 
>>>
>>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy 
>>> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>>>
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