Le 26-août-06, à 17:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
> A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains > conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However, > they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable. No. A computaionalist has no reason to believe that the multiverse is Turing emulable, given that it emerges from the sum of a continuum of histories. That is exactly why the computationalist has to justify the (apparent or not) computability of the physical laws. Cf the white rabbits which must be shown rare. > > Personally, I am open to the statement that the Multiverse is Turing > emulable, even if each history within the MV is definitely not. Does > the former statement make me a "computationalist"? Comp is "I a machine". I have already explain why this makes doubtful the physical universe is entirely computable. It is an open question if the uncomputability is entirely restricted to the comp indeterminacy or not. Below our level, it could be that the sum is "in average" computable. To be a computationalist is just saying yes to a doctor proposing a digital brain substitution. It makes the universe computable only in the case where "I am the universe" (unlikely, imo). > > >> Now I have a problem with the assertion "the UD emulates the full >> Multiverse". >> This is because, a priori, with comp, by the UDA, the comp-physical >> laws will emerge from the first person (plural) computations and their > > The comp-physical laws (indeed the physical ones) are 1st person > plural things, and in themselves not Turing emulable. But the ensemble > as described by Schroedingers equation [SWE] is deterministic and > reversible. Why shouldn't this be Turing emulable in your scheme? It could be. I hope it will be. But I cannot postulate the SWE. Open question. > >>> >>> So am I computationalist? On the most obvious level, no. However, >>> considering the above perhaps I am Bruno's sort of computationalist >>> with a very deep level of replacement (ie switching entire >>> realities). >> >> >> OK, that looks like what I was saying. >> >> >>> >>> Confused? That would make two of us. >> >> >> Ah? Why? You seemed quite coherent here ... >> > > Confused because I don't think that switching entire realities counts > as surviving the "Yes Doctor" experiment. Mathematician like extreme cases. Switching entire realities can be made to get illustration of very low level forms of comp. It gives comp models of "quasi non comp". They are not the only one, because the first person associated to the machine will be quite "not-comp" too in her ways. > > I do actually subscribe to the view that it is possible to replace my > brain with appropriately configured silicon & wires, but because of > the Maudlin/movie-graph argument, such an artifical brain must be > sensitive to > quantum randomness. This is a non-computationalist "Yes, Doctor" > proposition. I don't think so. Well, it all depends what you put in the quantum. Quantum randomness with comp could be just the MWI differentiation, or something else. If you believe the quantum randomness is not generable by a classical computer, not even by self-duplication (as opposed to third person simulation), then indeed, it belongs to non-comp, but then you are not saying yes to a doctor who propose to you a digital brain. Or if you prefer: your "saying yes" does not amount for a complete brain substitution, your brain here contains some part of the environment, but that is not "saying yes" to the doctor for a brain substitution, but only for a part of it. > > On a slightly incidental note, I was wondering your thoughts of a > possible paradox in your argument. Since COMP predicts > COMP-immortality, the doctor may as well make a recording of your > brain and put it in the filing cabinet to gather dust, as you will > survive in Plato's heaven anyway. Furthermore, you could just say "No > doctor", and still survive through COMP-immortality. > > It would seem that "Pascal's wager" should have you saying "No doctor" > (if the point was to survive terminal illness, anyway). Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really means "surviving through the yes doctor" = understanding that, in *that* case, we survive without doctor. It is the comp-immortality issue. In general I add the picture that an artificial brain is just a way to make longer the staying in the "Samsara", putting the "Nirvana" for later. Now people does not want immortality. They want just see their children growing, or the next soccer championship. They search quality of life, not quantity. And the comp immortality issue can make death still more unknown, and that can only motivate some for making that Samsara longer. The clinically immortal people, if ever, will not know what they miss, of course. We are talking at the G* level here, cautious. Many propositions in G* (minus G) seems somehow paradoxical. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
