David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > Maybe physics is relations all the way down. > > Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using > AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational > possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you > propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone 'all the way down')?
Primary matter of course. > > They are very different, and a lot of the work is done > > by the Platonic assumption. > > Good, we seem to agree that the conclusions of comp1 and comp2 are > different. And specifically the question of recursive priority - what > emerges from what - is hardly a trivial difference. Bruno has argued, > if I've got it right, that his version of > comp supports 1-->3 over 3-->1 (3 = 'the > relata'). Do you have a knock-down argument to the contrary, other than > a philosophical commitment to the priority of what can be 'seen' (as > opposed to, as Colin would no doubt say, *that* it can be seen)? I have several arguments. Principally against Platonism, without which he does not obtain his UD without building it. (I have noticed that you seem to equate a relation-only universe with Platonia. But the point about Platonia is is that there is no contingency there. A relation-only universe can still be a contingent universe, in which a UD fails to exist for some contingent reason). > BTW, I'm not arguing from the perspective of a 'convert' to comp, > merely as an interested seeker. However, like Colin, I don't feel that > physics as normally practised takes seriously enough the *fact* of > there being an observation (as opposed to the *effect* of an > observational process). Surely that is a psychological question. > When considered at all, it's as a putative > 'relational side effect' of the physics (e.g. standard > computationalism). PhysicalISM requires one to believe that. But physicalism isn't physics -- it is a metaphysical claim. > So part of my interest in comp is motivated by the > fact that it treats this aspect of 'everything' with maximum > seriousness, explicitly seeking a theory that elucidates the structure > of 'observation' equally with that of the 'observables' thus revealed. Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for qualia than physicalism. > Consequently, it may be of value to put final judgement on what sort of > state-of-affairs could support 'RITSIAR' on hold, pending an > exploration of these very interesting implications of comp. If a computation is only a subset of, or abstraction from, a physical process (as in non-Bruno computationalism), how can it explain things physics can't? > David > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on > > > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent > > > > > dialogues), > > > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is > > > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely > > > > > opaque > > > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'. > > > > > > > > No, not entirely opaque. > > > > > > Could you illuminate? > > > > Maybe physics is relations all the way down. > > > > > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not > > > > the conclusion. > > > > > > Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of > > > 3-person <--> 1-person) are surely somewhat different? > > > > They are very different, and a lot of the work is done > > by the Platonic assumption. > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between > > > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing > > > > > > and highly significant. > > > > > > > > > > It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have > > > > > remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. > > > > > > > > > > > A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism > > > > > > is much less so. > > > > > > > > > > Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? > > > > > > > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) > > > > > > > > > We do need, I > > > > > think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between > > > > > > > > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on > > > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent > > > > > dialogues), > > > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is > > > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely > > > > > opaque > > > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'. > > > > > > > > No, not entirely opaque. > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > > 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure > > > > > on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its > > > > > axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, > > > > > etc. > > > > > > > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not > > > > the conclusion. > > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > > > > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than > > > > > > > > matter, and the only way to > judge whether it is a good > > > > > > > > model to see how it corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > > > > > > > > > like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. > > > > > > > > It *might* be the really real > model - but so might any > > > > > > > > other model that fits all the data. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. > > > > > > > But in > > > > > > > fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the > > > > > > > data'. > > > > > > > > > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between > > > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing > > > > > > and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism > > > > > > is much less so. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---