Bruno Marchal wrote: > Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by > Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by: > > Computationalism entails COMP.
Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks vis-a-vis comp, that on the one hand: a belief in 'primary' matter can be retained provided it is not invoked in the explanation of consciousness, and on the other: that under comp 'matter' emerges from (what I've termed) a recursively prior 1-person level. Why are these two conclusions not contradictory? > You will have to attach > consciousness to actual material infinite. Why is this the case? David > Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: > > > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) > > > You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only > Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical > logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression "platonia" > for a place where all machines run forever or stop. Or, if I refer to > Plato, it means I refer to some precise proposition in Plato's > Theaetetus, or in its Parmenides. > So AR is indeed a very weak hypothesis, and has nothing to do with what > you call Platonism. > > Given that "platonism" seems to be too much charged, I propose to keep > the expression "Arithmetical realism" instead. It is, I recall, the > belief that arithmetical propositions are true or false. (Excluded > middle applies). > > > > > Le 22-oct.-06, à 20:31, David Nyman a écrit : > > > > Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I > > think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between > > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'. > > > > and > > > > 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure > > on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its > > axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, > > etc. > > Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by > Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by: > > Computationalism entails COMP. > > But I prefer to consider COMP just as a precise version of standard > computationalism. > Then the UDA shows, or is supposed at least to show, that if we believe > in computationalism (perhaps even motivated by materialism at first) > then > we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon > either computationalism or materialism. > The contradiction is only epistemological: it is possible to keep a > belief in material stuff with comp, but it is impossible to relate that > stuff with consciousness and subjective experience, including > consciousness of experimental result in physics. So UDA shows that the > notion of primitive or fundamental matter can not been used to explain > result of any experience in physics. > Of course such a result is annoying for materialist because > computationalism is their favorite implicit or explicit theory of > mind. My point is that it does not work. > Although Penrose uses incorrectly Godel theorems, I agree with his > conclusion: if you want a universe made of primitive matter, then the > only way to make consciousness "physical" or "material" will consist in > abandoning comp in the philosophy of mind. You will have to attach > consciousness to actual material infinite. If you want to keep comp > instead, you have to abandon the notion of primitive matter. But in > that case, of course, you have to explain the appearance of matter > from and only from comp. OK? > > > Descartes was already aware that mechanism (even non digital) is a > threat for materialism. His solution has consisted in positing an > infinitely good God, unable to cheat us, so that our material illusion > is founded by God's Goodness. I don't follow him that far, but > Descartes solution is in the same spirit as the use of > "self-consistency" bets explanation of matter by the lobian machine. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---