David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed > > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? > > How can I fail to have similar information content > > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply > > spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own > > consciousness? > > What I mean by 'closed' is that not merely the objects of perception, > but the means of acquisition of perceptual content (i.e. the dyad), are > alike constrained by the information content - or structure - of the OM > itself. There isn't a further 'sympathetic' - or whatever - access to > information due to 'similarity' - by what process could this occur?
Yes -- in terms of causality, process, dynamic time, counterfactuals, etc. In terms of Platonia and block universes, informational similarity becomes more important because process and causation are less important. > As > to each neuron having its own 'consciousness', this is neither here nor > there - whatever could the *content* of such consciousness be? The molecule-by-molecule information content of a neuron would be quite complex. >The very > point is that there must be a complex interaction, seamlessly relating > perceiver-process with percept-process (e.g. constructing memory, > representation, etc.), in order for the 'I' to emerge and coherently > assert itself. We know this from the way such processes fragment and > break down under the impact of Alzheimers and short-term memory > disfunction. Self-referential consciousness can only be sustained > through a highly organised *process*, not merely an inherent > undifferentiated quality. Is there process in a BU? > So of course 'you' have similar information content 'five minutes from > now'. This is how you (and we) make the identification that this > particular 'I' is 'you' - the persistency of information through which > 'you' can be tracked. It's also the only distinction between 'you' and > 'me'. So for this reason there would be exactly the same argument for > (or against) 'sympathetic overlap' between OMs containing you, and > those containing me. And, interesting though this might be, personally > I fail to experience any such communion, short of this particular > channel of information that (literally) connects our respective OMs. > > David > > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they > > > > are not, it must be rejected. > > > > > > I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point. > > > > Well, I think it is. Perhaps you could say why it is not. > > > > > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what > > > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain > > > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the > > > available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes > > > each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads, > > > without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation. > > > > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed > > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? > > How can I fail to have similar information content > > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply > > spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own > > consciousness? > > > > > Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of: > > > > > > > A consciousness spread across time. > > > > > > if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple > > > 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or > > > > There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons > > into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is. > > But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't > > it apply across time. > > > > > > We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not > > > > the same consciousness. > > > > > > Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous > > > consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same > > > consciousness. > > > > But the difference of your and my consiousness > > is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness > > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my > > consciousness > > now, information-wise. > > > > > There is no logical distinction between the two cases, > > > unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction > > > between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is > > > me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no > > > other means of differentiation. > > > > Which is precisely my point. My consciousness > > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my > > consciousness > > now, information-wise. > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem > > > > > > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. > > > > > > > > > > Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that > > > > > this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to > > > > > contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial > > > > > point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently > > > > > informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in > > > > > terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov. > > > > > > > > Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they > > > > are not, it must be rejected. > > > > > > > > > And > > > > > surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple' > > > > > experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental > > > > > intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves, > > > > > informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally > > > > > validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov. > > > > > > > > I don't see how POV's can be logically prior > > > > to a space time structure. > > > > > > > > > This is why > > > > > I have previously been so insistent about the 'global' nature of the > > > > > 1-person (although I know this has led to terminological confusion). > > > > > Its 'globality' consists in the fact that *any* suitably constituted > > > > > region of reality equally partakes of this self-referential experience > > > > > of 'I'. > > > > > But the *content* of each 1-person OM is inherently limited by > > > > > its information content. Doesn't this image do the trick for you? > > > > > > > > > > > > All I know is what I am > > > > > > > experiencing *now*. > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. > > > > > > > > > > But it doesn't. What do you think you would experience in a BU > > > > > (focusing on the presence of observer moments, rather than the > > > > > A-series > > > > > versus B-series issue)? > > > > > > > > A consciousness spread across time. > > > > > > > > > What process exists that could coherently > > > > > totalise or synthesise in some way the informationally separated OMs? > > > > > > > > The question is what could make the conscious one-at-a-time > > > > if not the flow of time. > > > > > > > > > You might as well say that you and I should somehow have overlapping > > > > > consciousness right now. > > > > > > > > We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not > > > > the same consciousness. > > > > > > > > > Well, we don't, because we have different > > > > > information horizons - and just *this much* information crosses these > > > > > barriers to become part of our joint conciousness. I think the analogy > > > > > is pretty direct. > > > > > > > > My future selves will contain information from my > > > > present self. But they are not conscious *yet*. > > > > > > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of > > > > > > > > > > having no > > > > > > > > > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For > > > > > > > > > > change to be > > > > > > > > > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in > > > > > > > > > > something. > > > > > > > > > > It could be a contingent natural law that certain > > > > > > > > > > properties never > > > > > > > > > > change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes > > > > > > > > > > a logical > > > > > > > > > > necessity that the substrate endures through change; since > > > > > > > > > > all changes > > > > > > > > > > are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot > > > > > > > > > > itself > > > > > > > > > > change and must endure through change. In more detail here > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why must "change... be change in something"? It sort of > > > > > > > > > sounds reasonable > > > > > > > > > but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out > > > > > > > > > the superfluous > > > > > > > > > ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) > > > > > > > > > coordinates (x1, t1, red) > > > > > > > > > and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the > > > > > > > > > object has changed > > > > > > > > > from red to orange. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we already know what distinguishes the time co-ordinate > > > > > > > > from the space co-ordinate. What is our usual > > > > > > > > way of doing that? The time co-ordinate is the one that is > > > > > > > > always > > > > > > > > changing... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Time and Possibility > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Imagine a universe in which there was no change, nothing > > > > > > > > actually > > > > > > > > occurs. In the absence of events, it would be imposssible to > > > > > > > > distinguish any point in timw from any other point. There would > > > > > > > > be no > > > > > > > > meaning to time -- such a universe would be timeless. > > > > > > > > Now imagine a universe which is completely chaotic. Things > > > > > > > > change so > > > > > > > > completely from one moment to the next that there are no > > > > > > > > conistent > > > > > > > > things. This universe is made up solely of events, which can be > > > > > > > > labelled with 4 coordinates . [ x,y,z,t]. But which coordinate > > > > > > > > is the > > > > > > > > time coordinate ? One could just as well say [ y,t,z,x]. In the > > > > > > > > absence > > > > > > > > of persistent ojects there is nothing to single out time as a > > > > > > > > 'direction' in a coordinate system. So again time is meaingless. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In order to have a meaningful Time, you need a combination of > > > > > > > > sameness > > > > > > > > (persisitent objects) and change (events). So time is posited > > > > > > > > on being > > > > > > > > able to say: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "Object A changed from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time > > > > > > > > T2." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You're just stating that time is different from space. Time and > > > > > > > space are also > > > > > > > different from colour, or any other property an object may have. > > > > > > > If we didn't > > > > > > > have time there would be no change, if we didn't have height > > > > > > > everything would > > > > > > > be flat, and if we didn't have colour everything would be black. > > > > > > > > > > > > But it isn't an arbitrary difference. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be > > > > > > > > > distinguishable from a virtual > > > > > > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is > > > > > > > > > possible, for the sake > > > > > > > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your > > > > > > > > > conscious > > > > > > > > > experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to > > > > > > > > > "flow" and they do > > > > > > > > > not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate > > > > > > > > > universes or in separate > > > > > > > > > rooms, to be separate. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a > > > > > > > > mathematical > > > > > > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all > > > > > > > > mathematical > > > > > > > > structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me > > > > > > > > up till > > > > > > > > 1 second ago) > > > > > > > > + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing > > > > > > > > mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have > > > > > > > > never > > > > > > > > seen one is > > > > > > > > evidence against a mathematical multiverse. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument > > > > > > > against a physical > > > > > > > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse. > > > > > > > > > > > > Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are. > > > > > > Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single > > > > > > universes, > > > > > > or almost as unconstrained as multiverses. > > > > > > > > > > > > > If a physical MV > > > > > > > exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in > > > > > > > the next second. > > > > > > > > > > > > With a very low measure. > > > > > > > > > > > > > The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical > > > > > > > multiverse or there is > > > > > > > a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low > > > > > > > measure. Similarly in > > > > > > > a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low > > > > > > > measure. > > > > > > > > > > > > Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation > > > > > > (that > > > > > > is > > > > > > basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists > > > > > > cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or > > > > > > contingnet > > > > > > in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for > > > > > > them. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If you died today and just by accident a possible next > > > > > > > > > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a > > > > > > > > > trillion years in the > > > > > > > > > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion > > > > > > > > > years in the future. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in > > > > > > > > an HP > > > > > > > > universe. But I never do. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a > > > > > > > moment from now 2 copies > > > > > > > of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, > > > > > > > you have a 2/3 chance > > > > > > > of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding > > > > > > > yourself in Washington. > > > > > > > > > > > > What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every > > > > > > configuration of matter. > > > > > > (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations > > > > > > where > > > > > > I'm in Washington, > > > > > > configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in > > > > > > Narnia. > > > > > > There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy > > > > > > of me > > > > > > in Moscow, > > > > > > 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in > > > > > > Platonia. > > > > > > > > > > > > (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical > > > > > > mutliverse > > > > > > is an entirely different matter). > > > > > > > > > > > > > It is a > > > > > > > real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to > > > > > > > be experienced than the > > > > > > > orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a > > > > > > > summary of some of the > > > > > > > debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a > > > > > > > mathematical as opposed > > > > > > > to a physical multiverse. > > > > > > > > > > > > Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match > > > > > > observation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness > > > > > > > > > implemented > > > > > > > > > in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, > > > > > > > > > it would be impossible > > > > > > > > > to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there > > > > > > > > > may not *be* any past > > > > > > > > > moments: your present experience may include false memories > > > > > > > > > of your past, and > > > > > > > > > whole world may have been created a second ago. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A simulation running on a computer is still a dynamic, temporal > > > > > > > > process. The point is that the passage of > > > > > > > > time tells me that I am not in Platonia. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is > > > > > > > > only a > > > > > > > > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the > > > > > > > > subjective > > > > > > > > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a > > > > > > > > sequence in > > > > > > > > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional > > > > > > > > "snapshots" of > > > > > > > > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain > > > > > > > > information > > > > > > > > relating back to previous ones. > > > > > > > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A > > > > > > > > B-series > > > > > > > > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a > > > > > > > > series of > > > > > > > > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's > > > > > > > > memories > > > > > > > > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) > > > > > > > > and so on, > > > > > > > > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to > > > > > > > > another. > > > > > > > > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they > > > > > > > > have a > > > > > > > > natural sequence, but that is all. > > > > > > > > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that > > > > > > > > only one > > > > > > > > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or > > > > > > > > none > > > > > > > > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" > > > > > > > > option. > > > > > > > > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are > > > > > > > > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe > > > > > > > > spatialises > > > > > > > > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional > > > > > > > > entity. > > > > > > > > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I > > > > > > > > would > > > > > > > > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present > > > > > > > > consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Whether the Block Universe model is right or not, the series of > > > > > > > clones you > > > > > > > describe, set up as an experiment, would still give the > > > > > > > experience of being > > > > > > > continuously conscious through time. > > > > > > > > > > > > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem > > > > > > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I remember being conscious a second > > > > > > > ago but how could I possibly know that I didn't just pop into > > > > > > > existence > > > > > > > complete with false memories half a second ago? > > > > > > > > > > > > That isn't the problem. The problem is that if time is just like > > > > > > space, as the BU theory states, you should have single consciousness > > > > > > spread across time, not a temporal sequence of one-at-a-time > > > > > > conscious states. > > > > > > > > > > > > > All I know is what I am > > > > > > > experiencing *now*. > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. > > > > > > > > > > > > > It is only because I have memories and a sense of being > > > > > > > the same person over time that I consider it was "I" who woke up > > > > > > > this morning > > > > > > > and it will be "I" again who goes to bed tonight. I don't have a > > > > > > > direct telepathic > > > > > > > link to past or future selves, or copies in the next room, to > > > > > > > ensure that they are > > > > > > > "really me". All I have to go on are my present memories and > > > > > > > beliefs, which could > > > > > > > in theory be artificially implanted without changing anything > > > > > > > about my stream of > > > > > > > consciousness. Nothing is changed if we say that we live only > > > > > > > transiently, and the > > > > > > > feeling that we persist as individuals through time is an > > > > > > > illusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > > > > > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > > > > > > > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
