Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit : > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > But c breaks down into: > > > > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of > > > > physics > > > > and > > > > c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff. > > > > > > > > The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible > > > > configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But > > > > I only experience c1. > > > > > > That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write > > > this... > > > > I could have experienced periods of causal > > stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during > > one > > of the stable periods. > > Well in typical Everett MWI you also could...
Mixtures of stability and craziness are mathematically necessary. > > > and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which > > > means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at > > > least one) of you will experience it. > > > > Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW > > --. not physical MW. > > But why ? It doesn't exlain my expreience. > consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! No they are not. In PMW you can choose measure to match observation. > In any > case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not > about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of "what > happens" at the time a choice is made. In an MMW, measure cannot be chosen to match experience, empirically, it has to be deduced apriori. > Even an infinitesimal probability > is "instantiated" with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not > prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as > real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins... MMW may not be able to give strange events a lower probability than everyday ones. PMW can do this because it leans on the SWE, but that is arrived at empirically. > > > Be it a mathematical MW or physical MW. > > > > Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be > > deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have > > a solution? > > Several ways of defining one has been discussed on this list for a long time > now see ASSA vs RSSA, see the Universal Distribution, etc. I know attempts have been made. But it is more difficult if everything has to be done apriori. > > > Now if you say HP/WR are not possible in classical everett MWI, please > > > explain how... > > > > Some are ruled out -- because quantum laws are still laws -- some > > aren't. PMW is narrower than MMW, but still broader than SW. > > > > > Now if you don't agree with MW theories then it seems you are > > > stuck explaining why the real is only composed of that and not this... > > > > 1. If everything is contingent, there are contingent facts. > > > > 2. If everything is necessary...it is a contingent fact that > > everything is necessary...so there is still at least one > > contingent fact. > > > > 3. You can't avoid contingency. > > I don't understand what you mean by this, I apology. The ultimate explanation for "why the real is only composed of that and not this..." is contingency. Contingency isn't a very satisfactory explanation to the rationalist mind...but contingency is very hard to avoid entirely. > Quentin Anciaux --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---