Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
> A computationalist would add that a computer analogue > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more > controversial. Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't know people who object to comp. Of course someone like Searle could gives the feeling that he dislike comp, but its own reasoning, if you read it carefully, proves that he accept comp, albeit only for low substitution level unlike most "functionalist". Now as you know comp is my working hypothesis so this is for me just a bit out of my topic. Remember that for postulating "not-comp" you have to introduce high infinities in the third person description of the brain/body. In particular you have to abandon QM, or any theory ever proposed in physics and cognitive science. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
