Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part): > > > > A computationalist would add that a computer analogue > > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more > > controversial. > > > Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't > know people who object to comp.
Hardly anyone thinks it is a good explanation of phenomenality/qualia. Computationalists tend to be people who care a lot more about thinking than feeeling. > Of course someone like Searle could gives the feeling that he dislike > comp, but its own reasoning, if you read it carefully, proves that he > accept comp, albeit only for low substitution level unlike most > "functionalist". Another staunch opponent is Edelmann. http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178 'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes, that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. "I claim," he writes, "that the entire structure on which the cognitivist enterprise is based is incoherent and not borne out by the facts.' > Now as you know comp is my working hypothesis so this is for me just a > bit out of my topic. Remember that for postulating "not-comp" you have > to introduce high infinities in the third person description of the > brain/body. No you don't. You can posit that phenomenality inheres directly in matter, or that matter otherwise pins downs an absolute level of simulation. > In particular you have to abandon QM, or any theory ever > proposed in physics and cognitive science. No theory of physics entails that simulations will have all the features -- other than functional/structural ones -- of the systems simulated. > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
