Russell Standish wrote: > On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 08:54:51AM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other >>> computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of >>> being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A. >>> >>> This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not! >> I wasn't aware that there was any accepted way of assigning a probability to >> "being in a universe A". Can you point to a source for the proof of this >> theorem? >> >> Brent Meeker >> > > See theorem 4.3.3 aka "Coding Theorem" in Li and Vitanyi. > > Being in a simulation corresponds to adding a fixed length prefix > corresponding to the interpreter to the original string, although > there will also be other programs that will be shorter in the new > interpreter. > > After summing over all possible machines, and all possible programs > simulating our universe on those machines, you will end with a > quantity identical to the Q_U(x) in that theorem, aka "universal a > priori probability". > > Note that in performing this sum, I am not changing the reference > machine U (potential source of confusion). > > > Of course this point is moot if the universe is not simulable!
Or if the length of the code has nothing to do with it's probability. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---