On Wed, Dec 13, 2006 at 03:41:31PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:45, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> > Essentially that is the Occam razor theorem. Simpler universes have
> > higher probability.
>
>
> In the ASSA(*) realm I can give sense to this. I think Hal Finney and
> Wei Dai have defended something like this. But in the comp RSSA(**)
> realm, strictly speaking even the notion of "one" universe (even
> considered among other universes or in a multiverse à-la Deutsch) does
> not make sense unless the comp substitution level is *very* low. Stable
> appearances of local worlds emerge from *all* computations making all
> apparent (and thus sufficiently complex) world not "turing emulable".
> Recall that "I am a machine" entails "the apparent universe cannot be a
> machine" (= cannot be turing-emulable (cf UDA(***)).
>
> Bruno
I appreciate your result, that "I am machine" implies that "my input
is not algorithmic". However, Occam's razor is actually a property of
observation, under at least certain reasonable models of
observation. Feed a human being a random string (eg a Rorschach plot),
and he/she will interpret it as something simpler than a random string
("that cloud looks like a rabbit"). I would hypthesise that this
property necessarily arises in any evolutionary derived
intelligence. I would further hypothesise that all intelligences must
arise evolutionarily.
Gell-Mann has something about "Effective Complexity" in his book
"Quark and Jaguar". What I've been writing about (in various of my
papers) is a somewhat more formal version of this, though no doubt not
so formal by your standards :).
Cheers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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