Indeed, thanks. This has been very interesting. It will take me some time to process this.
On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Dear Bruno, > > thanks for the long and informative post. > > > Hmmm.... The UDA should just show that, and I am not sure which points > > you are missing. Suppose there is a physical concrete universe and that > > I know that I am missing a point somewhere :-) > I have printed out your post and will work it through carefully, it will > take some time before I can respond. > > > Please ask any questions. > > Thanks, as said above, will take some time. > > >Be sure you have completely grasp the first > > person comp indeterminacy before anything else (but the 1-3 distinction > > 1-person indeterminacy is no problem. My problem begins along steps 6-8, > especially when you dump the physical universe :-) > > This also relates to the duplication issue in the Bostrom paper: > when one presupposes physicalism, then duplication seems to be the > "proper" attitude - especially combined with a monist identity theory > of consciousness with matter (no supervenience or stuff, see this paper > for what I mean: > > Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism' > 2006 > http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/strawson/rmwpep.pdf > > It is really good (for physicalists at least :-)) > > And, as mentioned, I don't quite see how adoption of comp throws out > physicalism (I understand the argument, but what about parallelism - is > it a measure theoretic argument then against physicalism?). > > (Addendum: I mean physicalism in the broadest sense: I do not need > Aristotelian substance or whatever, simple structural relations à la > platonic computations suffice -> this is no standard position, but I am > working on this; the main difference between your position would be that > the SR variant includes spatiotemporal coordinates (at least from the > frog view) which could lead to duplication for identical computations > except for spatiotemporal labels) > > Assuming your variant (comp, yes doctor, AR): > I would be interested in what happens if, in a computational history, > you start seeing another "you" being simulated: like a russian doll, > comp within comp-> let us say you construct a VR that simulates for the > VR Bruno the same environment as the "outside"/"mainline comp" Bruno > sees -> would this comp within comp then add to the "outside" Bruno > measure? (I hope it is clear what I mean) - anyway, I have written more > than I wanted, another (real) response will follow when I have found the > time to think through your previous answer to me. > > Thanks again for your effort to make clear yours ideas, it is well > appreciated! > > Cheers, > Günther > > > -- > Günther Greindl > Department of Philosophy of Science > University of Vienna > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ > > Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ > Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---