Hi Gunther, On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails > panpsychism' 2006 > http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/strawson/rmwpep.pdf > The author admits himself that his doctrine is more a form of experential/non-experiential-ist (thus dualist) doctrine. It seems to me the usual dual naturalism. I can agree with the idea that "consciousness" is physical, but not as an explanation of consciousness, still less of course as an explanation of what is matter. It is exactly like Searle, but with "physical" in place of biological. Let me know if you understand that computationalism is just incompatible with that sort of move. Comp reduces completely the mind body problem into a necessary derivation of body-matter from a number/mind theory (like computer science, provablity logic + intensional variants, etc.). With comp, and a bit poetically, the physical is the border of computer's computer science (the border of computer science as seen by computers). But I have not yet finished Strawson's paper. Up to now, I appreciate it because it is quite clear (and thus clearly unconvincing with respect to the comp hyp). Thanks for the reference. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
