Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: > > >> On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will >>> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember >>> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be >>> it soft or hard wired). >>> >> Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? "I believe that >> persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious"? >> > > > > > Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to > realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same > impression with the discussion about zombie. > > For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all > your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad > absurdo which will follow). But now we can "redefined", or even just > *use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation) > without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background. > > For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, > i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. > There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a > materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the > sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non > materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is > implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of > zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A > zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the > appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a > materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). > > The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a > program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term > as "material implementation", but a non materialist can still believe > in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of > sort of quasi-"material" implementation: this would mean for him/her > "implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations". >
I don't see this. For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented idea or program is an incoherent concept. So for the non-materialist there can be no such distinction as "implemented" or "not implemented". But then what can it mean to refer to an "implementation relative to the most probable computations"? Brent > So we agree that a computation is not conscious. > That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have > to make the notion of person a bit more precise) > > Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented > by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all > computations have to be implemented". Indeed, most computer programmer > used the term "implementation" followed by "in Fortran" (or java, > lisp, etc.). > > A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program) > x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are > machine capable of implementing all machines. > > (and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like "arithmetic > implement all universal machines whose "dreams" (sharable first person > stories) cohere into "physical histories" which then locally implement > these universal machine into person. > > To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large > interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine > difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone > who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only > if you take matter fro granted. > > I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here. Except for: > > > >> >>> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be >>> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the >>> conclusion. So ... >>> >> No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested. >> > > > With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice > apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1, .... asap. > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
