Hi Gordon,
On 13 Nov 2008, at 19:36, Gordon Tsai wrote: > Bruno: > > I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. OK. > I tried to find the detailed description with no avail. > Even though I am new and still sipping through the snipits here, I > feel the potential of this hypothesis. I think the all the hard > problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, dualism/non-dual) are > basically circular dependent, like two coupled subsystems, perhaps > neither of them fundamental. How do we gain ‘the outside view’ of a > closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It’s like chess > pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath > rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as ‘self-observing > ‘ideal’ machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking > inside’ (pardon my poetic distortion). How close can we look? The > light is on but nobody’s home? If you know french, I can give you links to the places where I give detailed account. If not, just be patient. I will make a try on this list. Thanks for letting know your interest. Bruno Marchal > > Gordon > > > --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon) > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM > > On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: > > > > > > > On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the > >> argument > >> with people interested in the matter. > > > > True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) > > > >> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to > >> tell us what he means by a physical universe. > > > > I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, > > "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. > What's > > problematic about that?" > > > I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian > brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building. > Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from > that, and by this move created modern science including theology as > the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature > enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic, > both scientist and theologian get back to it. > Of course poets and mystics know better .... > > > > > And then the burden is back on us to explain > > why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than > it > > seems. Burden Tennis. > > > This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument > (hereafter MGA). > > > > > > > > > >> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging > use > >> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or > >> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). > > > > I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to > > some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay > (by > > anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that > > computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. > > > Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will > have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember > that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be > it soft or hard wired). > > > > > I > > believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian > > machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- > > experiments. > > > MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like > UDA, but it is deeply different. > > > > > > > > I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. > > > Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does > not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA > was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that > computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me > too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit > frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they > already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me > that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses > it with other type of criticism of comp. > > > > > It's easy for me to > > sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of > > actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that > > computations don't need to be implemented in order to be > conscious, so > > you're usually preaching to the choir with me. > > > You see! > > > > > My point is that, I can > > imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying "Ok, that makes sense > > *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in > order > > to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe > that." > > > Dennett, like many "naturalist" is not aware that the notion of > matter > is not obvious at all. The greeks were much more aware than all those > who followed, of the mind body problem (except Descartes and > Malebranche). Today people thought about the "consciousness" problem, > > when the real trouble is in defining both mind and matter and relating > them. And Dennett seems not to be aware that modern physics has not > progressed at all in the "hard problem of matter", on the contrary, > modern physics (quantum physics) makes the problem of matter even > harder (which in a sense *constitutes* a progress of course). The QM > many worlds saves the idea that matter is something objective, but > even the many worlds does not explain what matter is, and if it is, at > all. > > Dennett gives a good criteria of what could be an explanation of > intelligence or consciousness. It has to be something relating NON- > INTELLIGENT (or non-conscious) entity in such a way it explains > intelligence or consciousness. This is the basic idea behind Putnam's > functionalism, or even computationalism (which is the belief that > functionalism is true at least at some level of description of > oneself). > > So, why does Dennett not ask the same for an explanation of matter. > Matter should be explained without any use of the word matter, and so > it should be explained by relating only ... non material entities. But > nobody asks for that. Why? Because we are hardwired for not doubting > matter. We take for granted that matter is made of ... matter. > > Now, physics, if you look at it, never uses the concept of matter. It > is so typical in Newton physics where the material sun can become a > "material point" whose only role is to attract or repulse other > material point. Matter is explained in term of relative actions > occurring in a space-time frame. > > Even today, if you ask a string theorist what a string is made of, or > what a brane is made of, they look at you like if you are doing some > metaphysics just for annoying them, or they begin a lengthy > explanation where only mathematical objects appear. > > I am not sure physicist really believe in matter, but they fake such > belief for evacuating what they feel to be "only" a philosophical > problem, actually they try to escape the mind-body problem---except > few philosophers, don't take what I am saying to literaly. > > It is only when you grasp the mind body problem, that you realize you > have to be a bit more cautious when talking about mind *and* about > matter. > And MGA has been invented only to explain that mechanism does not, per > se, solve the mind-body problem. Indeed it makes the matter problem > the *only* big problem. Mind is well taking into account by "machine > discourse", which are well taken into account by computer science and > mathematical logic. > > > > > > > > > I guess what it comes down to is that the Movie Graph Argument on > its > > own doesn't seem fully convincing to me. But it's quite possible > that > > I don't fully understand that argument. (I have my own reasons for > > believing that computations don't need to be implemented in order to > > be conscious, and sometimes I think some of them are functionally > > equivalent to the MGA, but I'm not sure.) Where is the clearest > > statement of the MGA? > > > Now I feel guilty. There is just no presentations of the MGA in > English. The MGA appears the first time in my 1988 paper, written in > french. > It appears in full detail in my "Brussel's Thesis", 1994, which I > have > been obliged to write in French (by moral harassment). Then it appears > in my PhD thesis in France, which I did begin in english, and then I > have been force to translate in french (I have been unlucky, it was > not harassment, but the first year of application of the "Loi > Toubon", > forcing all thesis to be written in french). Note that in the two > theses, MGA precedes UDA. > > In this list, I have always suggest people to read the Maudlin"s paper > 1989, which develops a similar argument. Actually, some objections (by > Barnes) to Maudlin does not work on MGA. And one objection to MGA, the > conterfactual objection, is answered by Maudlin. It is easy to extend > MGA 1988 a few bit so that it handles the counterfactual objection > answered by Maudlin 1989 (and thats give the new MGA described in my > two theses). > > Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be > interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the > conclusion. So ... > > Are there still people believing in the necessity of matter for > consciousness (yet grasping UDA[1...7] ) ? > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---