Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/13 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>
>   
>> In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in 
>> which
>> signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is 
>> connected
>> causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique 
>> spacelike
>> snapshot and label it "the state".  I don't go so far as to claim that
>> consciousness *must be* instantiated in this way, but I think there must be
>> something that makes the "states" part of a process - not just snapshots.  
>> Bruno
>> gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a digital Turing like
>> process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to make the 
>> set
>> of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement that they 
>> be
>> a computation.  I have some doubts as to whether this is enough, but at 
>> least it
>> is something.
>>     
>
> It comes down to whether the brain is Turing emulable. If it is, then
> I see no problem describing it in terms of a sequence of discrete
> states. The question then arises whether the causal links between the
> states in an intact digital computer are necessary to give rise to
> consciousness, which is what I thought you were claiming, or whether
> the same states in disconnected fashion would achieve the same thing.
> Opponents of computationalism such as John Searle have argued that if
> a Turing machine can give rise to consciousness then the disconnected
> states would also have to give rise to consciousness, which is then
> taken as a reductio against computationalism. 
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a 
set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the integers 
are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing machine 
are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation, are 
sufficient isn't clear to me.

Brent

> The alternative way,
> saving computationalism, is, I think, Bruno's: it isn't the physical
> states giving rise to consciousness, but the computation as Platonic
> object.
>
>
>   


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