--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in > the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. > > > > You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, > > what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to experience > > it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by definition. If an > > "uncommon" experience gets experienced just as often as a "common" > > experience, then by definition they are equally common and have equal > > measure. > > > That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it > exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never > strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment > has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is > garanteed to be lived by definition.
It will be experienced - but not by most of "you". For all practical purposes it might as well not exist. > What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means their > measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant to > have at least *one* next moment for every moment. No and no. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---