And could you explicit the "not by you", if the "me" of 1000 years old has all my memories up to now (+ his own from now on to 1000 years old)... It is me, if you disagree what is personnal identity for you ? What is the magical "I" you're talking about ?
Quentin 2009/2/12 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> > > > 2009/2/12 Jack Mallah <jackmal...@yahoo.com> > >> >> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > > > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in >> > the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter. >> > > >> > > You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect >> on, what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to >> experience it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by >> definition. If an "uncommon" experience gets experienced just as often as a >> "common" experience, then by definition they are equally common and have >> equal measure. >> > > >> > That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it >> exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never >> strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment >> has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is >> garanteed to be lived by definition. >> >> It will be experienced - but not by most of "you". For all practical >> purposes it might as well not exist. > > > Well either the measure is strictly null and then I agree it does not exist > or it is not null and therefore it exists (by MWI). This all boils down to: > > - If there always exists a moment after any given moment then from 1st > person perspective you will be one of the available next moment whatever it > is (and whatever low absolute measure it could have, but with the most > probable expectation given by the highest measure next moment where you > exist). > - If there isn't then OK, QI is false. > > But here you're not clear at all, if the measure never drop to null, your > conclusion is erroneous. > > >> >> >> > What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means >> their measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant >> to have at least *one* next moment for every moment. >> >> No and no. >> >> > Yes and yes or I don't understand what you're talking about. > > Regards, > Quentin > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
