2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: > It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me. It would seem to imply that > after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our > "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories > belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me. But this doesn't seem to > occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the > brain.
I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable, and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively. In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all distinct. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---