On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >>> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you >>> even in >>> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case >>> he got >>> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in >>> the >>> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads >>> to the >>> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being >>> the >>> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this >>> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of >>> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is >>> needed for >>> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>> >>> >>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me... >> >> >> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to >> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is >> not >> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, >> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a >> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. > > Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was > destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits > of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a > different person who just happened to be similar - and the person > would agree with us. I am not sure. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" >>> (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? >> >> >> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. >> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe >> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify >> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with >> memories, >> which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of >> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their >> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. > > But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if > not conscious memories. So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution; > but that too is a form of memory. > > >>> >>> >>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what >>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in >>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I >>> don't see this as a theory of self identity. >> >> >> >> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. >> Here >> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me >> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to >> itself. >> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that >> unique >> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. >> >> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there, >> and >> "I" was me. > > Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can > compare the memories? That would be a reason to doubt I was me. > > >> To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it >> is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, >> unless >> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the >> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since >> recently, in >> salvia reports). >> >> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this >> means, I >> think, that we can still survive without them. > > I'm doubtful. I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of > how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful > fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction. I think "I" is a logical construction (we will come back on this). Memories have a big values, but "I" don't put it in my identity, nor would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this could be personal stuff. > > >> >> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a >> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from >> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have >> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? > > Dead. I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done last year or a minute ago, or a second ago? Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made? We are in the subtle à-la "The prestige" water ... Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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