Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> > > > On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >> >> >> Hi Kelly, and others, >> >> Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It >> usually >> last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with >> you, I know >> only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy >> you found >> your experience interesting. You can consult and discuss your >> experience, and those of others here: >> http://www.entheogen.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=135 >> >> Now the real question is, does that experience helped in >> providing, for >> example, an answer to my last remark to Quentin? >> >> I quote the question again. It is important concerning >> comp-immortality, and eventually how to derive physics from >> computer >> science. >> I do think such a question is difficult, and show the weakness in >> identifying the self with personal memories, and this >> justifies the >> necessity of the AUDA move, I think. >> >> Of course, if you enjoy dream-state-like, you can enjoy >> Salvia without >> troubling yourself with hard metaphysical questions. Yet I >> would be >> interesting if Quentin or Stathis, or anyone, could acknowledge a >> conceptual difficulty here. >> >> <<Hmmm... >> I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability >> "now", >> that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24 >> december >> 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March >> 2009) and >> reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March >> 2009, say)? >> The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in >> Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20 >> Augustus 2009 >> you (the you in Washington) suffered a "total amnesia". And >> then, >> "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through >> adequate >> medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of >> yous did >> move from W or M). >> >> >> Well I think all of this depends on the fact that your memories >> "come back". If it doesn't then I will not be in washington, cqfd. > > What if half of your memory come back? > > > Well, it would be a half me continuation... :-) > > And in the setup explained here... Plain me continuation would be the > one in Moscow... and Half me would be in washington. If me now could > meet both of me plain and half ... I would certainly identify current > me to be plain me. While I would care for half me, I care less of him > than plain me. But if no memories at all are left I wouldn't identify > him as myself like I don't identify you (nor any future you) as myself. > > >> >> >> What you're talking about salvia (loosing your personnal identity >> during the experience) is only correct because you have memories >> of it (salvia experience) on your current self which knows he is >> Bruno. If you had no memories of it then it makes no sense to say >> you did loose your "identity". > > Yes, but retrospectively, I can assert that I remain conscious, > despite the loss of identity. So, why should we not take such > "computational ontinuations" into account, in the immortality > question, and in the hunt of 1-white rabbits? This is certainly > not clear for me. > > > We should take in account those continuation where the memory loss is > temporary... not the one where I become you. The contrary is like the > believer in reincarnation, if you don't remember your past live then > it is the same as you didn't have any pas live and on a personal and > selfish view, totally useless to the current live. What's the point to > survive/reincarnate if there is nothing left of you.. I don't call > that surviving... I don't care if my body doesn't biologically > survive... I care that *I* (my mind/memories/experiences) survive. > > > > >> >> >> As for conscious dream... I don't think you *do* know you're >> conscious while dreaming, but you do know it after the dreaming >> experience. > > > John Mikes seems to think so too, but here I certainly disagree. > Lucid dreamer, who are verifiably in the paradoxical state of > dream (through EEG) , can communicate with the observer in the > lab, through eyes moves or through extremity of fingers (which are > not paralysed). > > > Well do they ? Does the dreamer remember interacting with the observer > (the real one) ? I know that outside sound/temperature/... act on the > dream, just because while dreaming we are never truly and completly > disconnected from the outside... But it says nothing about the > consciousness of the dreamer. The dreamer remember after being awake > he was somehow conscious, but was he really ? I do remember conscious > dream (or so I called) still do not really believe I was in the sense > I was now. > > > > They have made all the usual experience (singing, computing, > walking, running in the dream) and they have discover it generate > the same activity in the dream than in the waking life. The > experience of Laberge and Dement have definitely convinced me that > the hypothesis that we are unconscious during dream is badly founded. > Consciousness should not be confused with awakeness. >
Of course being asleep, whether dreaming or not, is not being unconscious. I sleep peacefully through my clock chiming, my wife getting up and coming back to bed; but I awake instantly if my name is whispered or there is a strange noise in the kitchen. Brent > > Could you give me some links about those experiences ? > > Thank you, > Quentin > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
