On 30 Apr 2009, at 13:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > >> This is essentially the problem discussed by Chalmers in "Does a Rock >> Implement Every Finite-State Automaton" >> at http://consc.net/papers/rock.html , >> >> Yes. And I don't buy that argument. I will not insist because you >> did it >> well in your last post. Also, if it was the case that rock implement >> sophisticated computations, it would just add some measure on some >> computations in the Universal Dovetailing. Also, a rock cannot be a >> computational object: it is a projection of an infinity of >> computations when >> we look at the rock at a level which would be below our common >> substitution >> level. Eventually we will met the quantum vacuum (assuming comp >> implies QM, >> as I think), and in some "parallel world" that vaccum will go >> through all >> accessible states, but this is part of so many variate histories >> that they >> interfere destructively and does not generate any classical history >> stable >> relatively to any observer coupled with the rock. >> >> >> and I think it's also the idea behind Maudlin's Olympia thought >> experiment >> as well. >> >> Maudlin's Olympia, or the Movie Graph Argument are completely >> different. >> Those are arguments showing that computationalism is incompatible >> with the >> physical supervenience thesis. They show that consciousness are not >> related >> to any physical activity at all. Together with UDA1-7, it shows >> that physics >> has to be reduced to a theory of consciousness based on a purely >> mathematical (even arithmetical) theory of computation, which >> exists by >> Church Thesis. >> The movie graph argument was originally only a tool for explaining >> how >> difficult the mind-body problem is, once we assume mechanism. > > The Rock argument and the Olympia/ Movie Graph argument are > diffferent, but they lead to the same conclusion if valid, namely that > if computationalism is true then consciousness does not supervene on > physical activity. I don't see why. If the rock implement conscious computation, this would just enrich the domain measure. > Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest > that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any > conscious computation supervenes on any physical activity (or > equivalently no physical activity, since at one extreme the Rock > argument allows that any computation is implemented by the null > state). ? > Chalmers tries to rescue computationalism in the paper cited > by arguing that the Rock argument is not valid. He tries to rescue "materialist computationalism". But this exactly what Olympia/movie-graph does not allow. I guess this is also why Chalmers defends dualism, even for quantum mechanics without collapse. When I met Chalmers he told me he stops at UDA step 3 (and left the room without much explanation). Some of its more recent writing indicates that he has perhaps change its mind, I dunno. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
