Bruno Marchal skrev: > > Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its > consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can > be conscious *about*. > It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes > systematic doubting procedure (this fit well with the self-reference > logics, taking consciousness as consistency). > > Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake > doubts)
Yes, you are right. I can only fake doubts... > > We live on the overlap of a subjective un-sharable certainty (the > basic first person knowledge) and an objective doubtful but sharable > possible reality (the third person belief). > > To keep 3-comp, and to abandon consciousness *is* the correct > materialist step, indeed. But you cannot keep 1-comp(*) then, because > it is defined > by reference to consciousness. When you say "yes" to the doctor, we > assume the "yes" is related to the belief that you will survive. This > means you believe that you will not loose consciousness, not become a > zombie, nor will you loose (by assumption) your own consciousness, by > becoming someone else you can't identify with. I can say "yes" to the doctor, because it will not be any difference for me, I will still be a zombie afterwards... -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
