On 31 Jul 2009, at 12:43, 1Z wrote:

>
>
>
> On 31 July, 10:03, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David):
>>
>>> But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the
>>> mental
>>> from the physical
>>
>> It is usually called the mind-body problem. There are many good book
>> on the subject.
>
> There are many bad solutions too. Finding a good solution
> means having an exat grasp of the problem, not saying in some
> vague way that mind and matter are different things.

I don't see to what you make allusion.


>
>
>> My own work is partially a reformulation of that problem (and
>> partially a beginning of a solution), when taking Mechanism seriously
>> into account.
>>
>> Tell us which step in UDA you have a problem of understanding with.
>> Give us a number between 1 and 8, and a justification. OK?
>
> I don't have a problem in understanding anything. I have  a problem
> in granting Platonism. Without Platonism, there is no UDA "just
> there".

I guess you mean that there is no universal dovetailer (UD) out there.
Who ever said that? I just say that the UD exists in the sense that  
you can prove its existence in a tiny weak part of Arithmetic.


>
> wihout a UDA there are no generated minds, without generated minds
> there is no illusory matter.

Sure. But the UD exists, like prime number exists.


> At best you have an alternative to
> materalism-realism,
> not a disproof of it.


Well, then there should be a number between 1 and 8, or 0 and 8 where  
you miss the step.
Apparently it is the 0 step, given that you still don't understand  
that my hypothesis is just classical digital mechanism. Classical  
means I accept the excluded third principle.

I think the confusion comes from the fact that I obtain platonist (in  
Plato or Plotinus sense) conclusions. But the hypotheses are 100%  
neutral or agnostic on this point. Like in Paris and Brussels you  
still confuse the conclusion (admittedly startling) and the hypothesis.

Show me a piece of text I have written, anywhere, which makes you  
think so please,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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