Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote: > >> >> >> On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an >>>> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only >>>> some >>>> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that >>>> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further >>>> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency. >>> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle- >>> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA. >>> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor >>> numbers). >> If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is >> no UD. > > I think you have a magical conception of reality. > I don't need to reify number to believe in them. > I just need to play with them. > > >>> I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent >>> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive. >> I am saying that material existence *is* contingent >> existence. It is not a structure of anything. > > Plotinus says that too! Me too. > With church thesis this is can be made more precise in term of not- > computable or not-provable, or some relativizations. > > > >>> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the >>> existence of primitive matter. >> Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each >> other. > > In arithmetic, that happens all the time. More below. > > > >>> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or >>> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter >>> does >>> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and >>> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter >>> Jones >>> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a >>> contradiction. >> It's not a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial >> PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all. > > Once you say yes to the doctor, there are immaterial Peter Jones. All > your doppelganger emulating you, and being emulated at your level of > substitution and below relatively occuring in the proof of the Sigma_1 > sentences of Robinson Arithmetic. (The arithmetical version of the UD). > > >>> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your >>> "consciousness >>> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature. >> No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. > > You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used > by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions, > which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum). > > > >> You keep confusing the >> idea >> that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs >> with the >> actual existence of those entities and beliefs. > > You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It > contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way, > with correct approximation of its neighborhood. It is hard to > recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge > numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there > exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain. > In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one, > it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and > behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses. > > >>> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that >>> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease >>> to >>> give referents to such "Peter Jones". >> False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR. >> I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it, >> no-one can see it, so it ain't there. > > Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take > the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer > science. > See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running > mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented > "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too. > > >>> Fregean sense is enough to see >>> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove >>> that >>> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they >>> are not. >> So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in >> the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs >> doesn't make us wrong >> about anything. > > > This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct > argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us > is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct > argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is > material. The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical > reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But > then your reasoning has to be false too. > The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not > Turing-emulable,
Why can't I just say I'm not Turing emulated? It seems that your argument uses MGA to conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct argument showing they are material. But this is already well known from "brain in a vat" thought experiments. >or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or > not. At this stage. > Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith, > that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet, > from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix. > > > > > >>> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing >>> emulable. >> No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me >> *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong. > > But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be > correct to. It is the same reasoning. > Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real" > one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your > doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you > better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that > sense. Or it is a relation to the rest of the world and you can say yes so long as the doctor maintains your relations to the rest of the world - i.e. physically instantiates your emulation. Brent > > > >>> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor. >> Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me >> materially? > > He will try. > > >> Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out. > > Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no > doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive, > assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of > universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which > capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation, > and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent- > contingent obeys laws. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
