On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:38, Flammarion wrote:

>>> That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
>>> with the full force of necessity --
>>
>> I don't remember. I don't find trace of what makes you think so.  
>> Where?
>
> Well, if it;s tacit you wouldn't find  a trace.


If I use this tacitly, you could still help in saying where I am using  
this, even tacitly.



>
> Other than that. all pointing out that I might be in a UDA
> and therefore wrong doesn't mean I am wrong now. only
> that I am not necessarily right.

If your context independent reasoning is wrong, then it is wrong  
everywhere.
If your reasoning depends on the context (being real/material), then  
it presupposes what it was supposed to show.



>
> If you don't think the UDA is meant to show that
> I am not necessarily right, maybe you could say what
> it is meant to show


To show that you are necessarily false. UDA shows that the notion of  
primitive matter is non sensical, given that it shows that you can use  
it to related it with any conscious observation.


>
>
>>> although your own argument does
>>> not have that force.
>>
>> If there is a weakness somewhere, tell us where.
>
> The conclusion of your argument *is* a necessary truth?

Yes. It shows the necessity that "comp entails no primitive matter  
available for the physical science".
It does not show the necessity of "no primitive matter available for  
the physical science"; only that this necessarily follows from the  
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science.
You remain free to abandon comp. But then you go back to the usual  
formulation of the mind-body problem with the information that you  
have to introduce actual infinities in both matter and mind.




>
>>> In fact, PM only has to be shown to be more
>>> plausible than the alternatives. It is not necessarily true  
>>> because of
>>> sceptical hypotheses like the BIV and the UD, but since neither of
>>> them has much prima-facie plausibility, the plausibility og PM
>>> is not impacted much
>>
>> ?  Ex(x = UD) is a theorem of elementary arithmetic.
>
> backwards-E x=UD is indeed true. Schools should not
> be teaching that backwards-E means ontological existence,
> since that is an open question among philosophers.


I am not sure I understand your expression "backwards-E". I only use  
the notion of arithmetical existence. Indeed what UDA shows is that  
physical existence has to be reduced to some sophisticated use of  
arithmetical existence. Indeed physical existence become a mode of  
self-reference (in AUDA).



>
>> I have been taught elementary arithmetic in school, and I don't think
>> such a theory has been refuted since.
>>
>> You will tell me that mathematical existence = non existence at all.
>> You are the first human who says so.
>
> I am not the first formalist.

You may be the last. But even formalist have no problem with  
arithmetical existence, only with set and real numbers (or infinite  
objects).
And also, AUDA works perfectly well in the formalist setting. Well,  
UDA could probably not satisfy a formalist who says "no the doctor",  
but you can recast it easily so that it works for a formalist studying  
the discourse of those who say "yes" to the doctor. The formalist will  
prove formally that they believe that matter must be explained through  
numbers.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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