On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
> > > > On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >>>> If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is >>>> responsible >>>> for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume >>>> some form of naturalism/materialism or computationalism).OK? If >>>> not, >>>> your brain (generalized or not) does not obeys to the laws of >>>> physics. >> >>> That may buy you no more than "mere" simulation. The CTM is a >>> stronger claim than the computability of physics. it means that you >>> will >>> get actual implementation (strong AI) and not just simulation (weak >>> AI) >> >> In that sense, I am OK here. Actually strong AI is even weaker than >> CTM. > > Be that as it may, neither is directly implied by the computability of > physics We agree on this. > >> My reconstitution can believe wrongly that he is me, yet >> conscious. But I was assuming some naturalism here, and if the >> physical laws are computable, and I still say no to the doctor, then >> my identity is no more defined by the computation, but by the actual >> matter which constitutes me, > > That is one reason for saying no. But then biology makes you at most seven years old. We do have evidence that our body molecules are replaced rather quickly. > Another is that your identity *is* > given > by the computation (in line with the idea that PM is propertiless), > and that > the computation needs to run "on the metal" (at 0 levelsof > virtualisation) > to be genuinely conscious and not just an ersatz functional > equivalent. But then you say no the digit-doctor and CTM is abandoned. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
