On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 2:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 19 Jan 2010, at 03:28, silky wrote:
>
> I don't disagree with you that it would be significantly complicated, I
> suppose my argument is only that, unlike with a real cat, I - the programmer
> - know all there is to know about this computer cat. I'm wondering to what
> degree that adds or removes to my moral obligations.
>
>
>
> I think there is a confusion of level. It seems related to the problem of
> free-will. Some people believe that free will is impossible in the
> deterministic frame.
>
My opinion is that we don't have "free will", and my definion of free-will
in this context is being able to do something that our "programming" doesn't
allow us to do.
For example, people explain free-will as the ability to decide whether or
not you pick up a pen. Sure, you can do either things, and no matter which
you do, you are exercising a "choice". But I don't consider this "free".
It's just a pre-determined as a program looking at some internal state and
deciding which branch to take:
if ( needToWrite && notHoldingPen ){ grabPen(); }
It goes without saying that it's significantly more complicated, but the
underlying concept remains.
I define "free will" as the concept of breaking out of a branch completely,
"stepping outside the program". And clearly, from within the program (of
human consciousness) it's impossible. Thus, I consider "free will" as a
completely impossible concept.
If we re-define free will to mean the ability to choose between two actions,
based on state (as I showed above), then clearly, it's a fact of life, and
every single object in the universe has this type of "free will".
But no machine can predict its own behavior in advance. If it could it could
> contradict the prediction.
>
> If my friend who knows me well can predict my action, it will not change
> the fact that I can do those action by free will, at my own level where I
> live.
>
> If not, determinism would eliminate all form of responsability. You can say
> to the judge: "all right I am a murderer, but I am not guilty because I am
> just obeying the physical laws.
> This is an empty defense. The judge can answer: "no problem. I still
> condemn you to fifty years in jail, but don't worry, I am just obeying
> myself to the physical laws".
>
> That is also why "real explanation of consciousness" don't have to explain
> consciousness *away*. (Eventually it is the status of matter which appear
> less solid).
>
> An explanation has to correspond to its correct level of relevance.
>
> Why did Obama win the election? "Because Obama is made of particles obeying
> to the Schoredinger equation."? That is true, but wrong as an explanation.
> "Because Obama promise to legalize pot"? That is false, but could have work
> as a possible explanation. It is closer to the relevance level.
>
> When we reduce a domain to another ontologically, this does not need to
> eliminate the explanation power of the first domain. This is made palpable
> in computer science. You will never explain how a chess program works by
> referring to a low level.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>
>
>
>
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--
silky
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