Bruno and David: there are concepts in your extremely interesting and informative discussion - 'beyond me':
First the "real existence" (beyond Bruno's 1st person sharable experience by machines). I call 'existence' everything that emerges in (any) 'mind' without calling it *real*, or *unreal*. Who has the means to distinguish the *"reality" of an existence*? we can think only in our human mini-solipsism (cf. Colin Hales) ABOUT some 'reality' what we MAY assume. Physical existence is IMO a figment by our explanatory skills (aided by math/physics etc.) of the gradually disclosed items in phenomena - poorly understood - over the millennia of human development. (Cf: the conventional sciences). Then again: CTM *testable?* by what rules? by the conventional (reductionist) science figments? Who can identify the "MIND" to test it? * Computational* also depends on the Comp applied unless we use(?) the Loebian omniscient super machine, as I deducted from Brunos words lately (for being 'computer-emulable'). I fear: if we position CTM above the physical sciences, we cannot judge it by physicality (the physically based scientific testability). I apologize for my *agnostic position* based on an unlimited complexity and its relations *of which we know only a fragment by a gradual epistemic enrichment still going on*. It reduces CTM in both its "C" (ordinary computer-applications) to the data-base and capabilities of the machine in question and the "M" to the figment represented in the reductionistic philosophy (including neurosciences, psychology, even religious beliefs). I am all for the *"First Person Sharable Experience. *That's all we got and that's all we can use. Even pertaining to communicated (3rd pers.?) information, which first gets - adjusted to our personal indiviual mindset - OUR 1st pers. experience. John Mikes On 7/31/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > On 31 Jul 2010, at 00:49, David Nyman wrote: > > On 30 July 2010 17:35, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >> ... and if you believe that the universe can be accounted for by a some >>> consistent mathematical structure. Which is an open problem. Assuming >>> mechanism, physical universes have no real existence at all, except as >>> first >>> person sharable experience by machines (mathematical digital machines). >>> >> >> Bruno, consideration of the particular way you expressed this above >> led to the following thoughts. Let us leave aside for the moment the >> question of whether "the universe can be accounted for by some >> consistent mathematical structure". I am aware, of course, of your >> detailed disproof per absurdum of the logical possibility of a >> physical basis for the computational theory of mind (CTM). It is >> noteworthy, nonetheless, that even in its "physicalist" version, CTM >> seeks to explain "first person sharable experience" as a "virtual >> mechanism", albeit here assumed to be capable of justification in >> terms of the relations of "fundamentally physical" tokens of some >> sort. Leaving aside for the moment whether this is ultimately a >> correct account or not, my point here is that it is already implicit, >> per such a physicalist version of CTM, that "the physical universe" - >> above whatever lowest level is taken to be "fundamental" - is >> essentially a set of "virtual levels". That is all entities, above the >> ultimate level of analysis, are conceived as supervening entirely on - >> and consequently as strictly superfluous to the independent operation >> of - the basic events supposed to account for both physical and mental >> processes. >> >> Consequently it is already implicit that, even in a physicalist >> version of CTM, to paraphrase what you say above:"physical universes >> (with the qualification - at any level above "ultimate physical >> events") have no real existence at all, except as first person >> sharable experience by digital machines". >> > > Above or below? I am not sure to understand your point. > > > > > However, given that IMO the >> arguments you advance do convince that CTM based on "physically real" >> tokens does indeed lead to absurd conclusions, this would remove the >> qualification "at any level above ultimate physical events". This >> leads directly to the unqualified claim, as you say, that "assuming >> mechanism, physical universes have no real existence at all, except as >> first person sharable experience by machines (mathematical digital >> machines)". >> > > I may agree. But computer science enters at this stage, and gives the way > to extract physics, and physical features from it, so that it makes the CTM > theory testable. Also we get simultaneously a theory of qualia and quanta. > If we postulate a basic physical universe, we can infer quanta, and have to > attach in some ad hoc and unsatisfiable way consciousness to some precise > computation in terms of those primitive quanta (be it a multi-computation > like with a quantum computer). > > All right? > > Bruno > > > > > >> David >> >> >>> On 30 Jul 2010, at 17:03, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 30, 2010 at 1:24 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 7/29/2010 10:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 10:55 PM, Mark Buda <her...@acm.org> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Numbers exist not in any physical sense but in the same sense that any >>>>> idea exists - they exist in the sense that minds exist that believe >>>>> logical propositions about them. They exist because minds believe >>>>> logical propositions about them. They are defined and distinguished by >>>>> the logical propositions that minds believe about them. >>>>> >>>>> There are three worlds: the physical world of elementary particles, the >>>>> mental world of minds, and the imaginary world of ideas. They are >>>>> linked, somehow, by logical relationships, and the apparent flow of >>>>> time >>>>> in the mental world causes/is caused by changes in these relationships. >>>>> >>>>> I wouldn't be surprised if the "laws" of physics are changing, slowly, >>>>> incrementally, right under our noses. In fact, I would be delighted, >>>>> because it would explain many things. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> The existence of numbers can explain the existence of the physical >>>> universe but the converse is not true, the existence of the physical >>>> world >>>> can't explain the existence of numbers. >>>> >>>> William S. Cooper wrote a book to show the contrary. Why should I >>>> credence your bald assertion? >>>> >>> >>> I should have elaborated more. The existence of mathematical objects >>> (not >>> just numbers, but all self-consistent structures in math) would imply the >>> existence of the universe (if you believe the universe is not in itself a >>> contradiction). >>> >>> ... and if you believe that the universe can be accounted for by a some >>> consistent mathematical structure. Which is an open problem. Assuming >>> mechanism, physical universes have no real existence at all, except as >>> first >>> person sharable experience by machines (mathematical digital machines). >>> >>> >>> It would also clearly lead to Bruno's universal dovetailer, as all >>> possible >>> Turing machines would exist. >>> >>> ... together with their executions. >>> >>> >>> Regarding the book you mentioned, I found a few books by William S. >>> Cooper >>> on amazon. What is the title of the book you are referring to? Does it >>> show that math doesn't imply the existence of the physical universe, or >>> that >>> the physical universe is what makes math real? Most mathematicians >>> believe >>> math is something explored and discovered than something invented, if >>> true, >>> and both math and the physical universe have objective existence, it is a >>> better theory, by Ockham's razor, that math exists and the physical >>> universe >>> is a consequence. I do understand that the existence of the physical >>> universe leads to minds, and the minds lead to the existence of ideas of >>> math, but consider that both are objectively real, how does the >>> universe's >>> existence lead to the objective existence of math, when math is infinite >>> and >>> the physical universe is finite? (at least the observable universe). >>> >>> >>> Also, Cooper's book just address the question of the origin of man's >>> beliefs >>> in numbers. I don't think Cooper tries to understand the origin of >>> natural >>> numbers. >>> Actually, we can explain that numbers cannot be justified by anything >>> simpler than numbers. That is why it is a good starting point. >>> I doubt your statement that a physical universes can explain mind. Unless >>> you take "physical" in a very large sense. The kind of mind a physical >>> universe can explain cannot locate himself in a physical universe. This >>> comes from the fact that the identity thesis (mind-brain, or >>> mind/piece-of-matter) breaks down once we assume we can survive a >>> 'physical' >>> digital brain substitution. >>> We can ascribe a mind (first person) to a body (third person), but if >>> that >>> body is turing emulable, then a mind cannot ascribe a body to itself. It >>> can >>> ascribe an infinity of bodies only, weighted by diverging computational >>> histories generating the relevant states of that body, below the >>> substitution level. This can be said confirmed by quantum mechanics, >>> where >>> our bodies are given by all the Heisenberg-uncertainty variant of it. >>> I agree roughly with the rest of your remarks (and so don't comment >>> them). >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Belief in the existence of numbers also helps explain the unreasonable >>>> effectiveness of math, and the fine tuning of the universe to support >>>> life. >>>> >>>> If numbers are derived from biology and physics that also explains their >>>> effectiveness. Whether the universe if fine-tuned is very doubtful (see >>>> Vic >>>> Stengers new book on the subject) but even if it is I don't see how the >>>> existence of numbers explains it. >>>> >>> >>> Vic Stenger's argument is that fine-tuning is flawed because it assumes >>> life >>> such as ours. But even assuming a much more general definition of life, >>> which requires minimally reproduction, competition over finite resources, >>> and a relatively stable environment for many billions of generations what >>> percentage of universes would support this? Does Stenger show that life >>> is >>> common across the set of possible mathematical structures? >>> >>> The existence of all mathematical structures + the anthropic principal >>> implies observers finding themselves in an apparently fine-tuned >>> universe. >>> Whereas if one only believes in the physical universe it is a mystery, >>> best >>> answered by the idea that all possible universes exist, and going that >>> far, >>> you might simply say you believe in the objective reality of math (the >>> science of all possible structures). >>> >>> >>>> I think it is a smaller leap to believe properties of mathematical >>>> objects >>>> exist than to believe this large and complex universe exists (when the >>>> former implies the latter). >>>> Even small numbers are bigger than our physical universe. There are an >>>> infinite number of statements one could make about the number 3, >>>> >>>> Actually not on any nomological reading of "could". >>>> >>> >>> If 3 exists, but we don't know everything about it, how can 3 be a human >>> idea? There are things left to be discovered about that number and >>> things >>> no mind in this physical universe will ever know about it, do you think >>> our >>> knowledge or lack of knowledge about it somehow affects 3's identity? >>> What >>> if in a different branch of the multiverse a different set of facts about >>> 3 >>> is learned, would you say there are different types of 3's which exist in >>> different branches? I think this would lead to the idea that there is a >>> different 3 in every persons mind, which changes constantly, and only >>> exists >>> when a person is thinking about it. However the fact that different >>> minds, >>> or different civilizations can come to know the same things about it >>> implies >>> otherwise. >>> >>> >>>> some true and some false, but more statements exist than could ever be >>>> enumerated by any machine or mind in this universe. Each of these >>>> properties of 3 shapes its essence, but if some of them are not >>>> accessible >>>> or knowable to us in this universe it implies if 3 must exist outside >>>> and >>>> beyond this universe. Can 3 really be considered a human invention or >>>> idea >>>> when it has never been fully comprehended by any person? >>>> >>>> On the contrary, I'd say numbers and other logical constructs can be >>>> more >>>> (but not completely) comprehended than the elements of physical models. >>>> That's why explaining other things in terms of numbers is attractive. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> Can anything in physics determine the multiples of 3 between N and N + 9, >>> where N is 7 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 100 (Using Knuth's up arrow notation)? Would you >>> say >>> N doesn't exist because it is too large to for anyone to know? Or does >>> it >>> only exist now that I thought about it and wrote it down? Despite that I >>> know very little about that number. If it doesn't exist, it implies 3 >>> has a >>> finite number of multiples, which seems strange. Does that mean >>> different >>> numbers have different numbers of multiples, either depending on what is >>> thought up or what is small enough to express in the universe? I am >>> interested in how the approach that numbers/math are only ideas handles >>> such >>> questions. >>> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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