On Dec 3, 4:49 pm, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > How do you know? You can't maintain > > that indirect realism is true independent > > of any metaphysical presumptions. > > I don’t maintain that indirect realism is true. Only that direct > realism isn’t, as it can’t account for colors, illusions, delusions, > dreams, hallucinations, etc. You need more than the falsity of direct realism to prove idealism > >> This is true in all cases: scientific realism, scientific > >> materialism, BIV, matrix, other skeptical scenarios. > > > It is not the same in all cases. > > > World+Experience > > > is simpler than > > > World+Vat/Matrix+Experience > > The Vat/Matrix is part of the World, not something that exists in > addition to the World. That’s obvious enough. But you don't have to assume a Vat/Matrix for realism, so the world is that much simpler > Note that we don’t need a perfect simulation of the tree and ground > and air molecules and intestinal bacteria. Only good enough to > produce the same experience...and experience is obviously pretty > course-grained. Many different microscopic states will produce the > same macroscopic experience. Theoretically we don’t even need a > simulation...just a table of time indexed sensory input values to feed > to the brain. > > Given this, it’s not clear that a real body sitting under a real tree > on a real planet orbiting a real sun is even the simplest way to > generate the experience of sitting under a tree. > > Where would the Vat/Matrix come from? Well, where did the tree, > planet, and sun come from? It just takes a rearrangement of initial > conditions to get a vat/computer instead of a tree/planet/sun. Well, there;s a whole lot of problems with that. For one thing, if you want to avoid solipsism, you need multiple vats. For another you are putting forward a scenario with an an unnaturally special, contrived starting state rather a naturally distinguished starting state such as minimum entropy > What > would make one set of initial conditions more complex than the other? > > I assume that you somehow feel that the BIV scenario must be more > complicated because it is a vat AND it is somehow a > representation/simulation of the environment that the brain > experience Because we would normally think of it being embedded in a real world > > >> BIV, matrix, etc. don't introduce additional elements, they just > >> arrange the "causal" elements differently. > > > Wrong. The vat is an additional element > > Wrong. It’s just a different arrangement of quarks and electrons. Either it;s in a real world, or the universe is contrived an unnatural > > That's non-explanatory. No-one thinks Occams' razor means you should > > give up on explanation. "Explanations should be as simple as possible, > > but no simpler" > > The Physical World Hypothesis doesn’t explain anything, as it is just > a bunch of terms that are themselves in need of explanation. All explanations are non-ultimate in that sense, but some are less contrived than others. > I’ll agree that there appear to be recurring patterns in our > observations, and that these patterns can be described via > mathematical equations. And that we can assign catchy labels like > mass, spin, and charge to the various parts of the descriptive > equations. > > But this is all description, not explanation. Since it is predictive it is explanation. However it is not ultimate explanation. > You can construct > speculative metaphysical theories about how the various equations and > variables represent real things that exist in the world, but these are > just fanciful stories. Mathematical metaphors not real explanations. If there are no "real", ie ultimate, explanations, I will settle for what is useful, predictive, etc. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
