On Sun, Apr 17, 2011 at 6:32 PM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote: > We exercise a decisionmaking 'will' that is a product of the 'mini' > everything we are under the influences of. But "free" it is not.
Well put. So, here is a summary of Dennett's position: "Dennett makes use of his treatment of the intentional stance to argue for compatibilism. Just as the decision to adopt the intentional stance towards a system is a pragmatic one, so too is it a pragmatic decision to adopt towards a system the stance that it is a morally responsible person. Dennett calls this latter stance the personal stance (1973, pp. 157–8). As with the intentional stance, there is nothing metaphysically deep required to interpret legitimately a system as a person (no special faculty of the will, for instance). Such systems are morally responsible agents if interpreting them according to the personal stance pays off (1984a, pp. 158–63). And of course, just as the physical (or the deterministic) stance is compatible with the intentional stance, so too, according to Dennett, is it compatible with the personal stance. Furthermore, just as he treats the intentional stance, Dennett argues that, due to the complexity of such systems, it is practically impossible to interpret and predict the system purely from the physical (deterministic) stance. Hence, the physical stance will never supplant the personal stance. We persons involved in the everyday commerce of interacting with each other need the personal stance; it is not threatened by the specter of determinism. " http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ So he also appeals to pragmatism. If it is useful to treat someone (or something) as morally responsible, then they are. The reasoning there seems suspect to me, and again gets into definitional issues - but even if I accept his point, I still say that this stance is *not* useful when dealing with society as a whole. The system of interest is society, not the individual. If there are commonalities in individuals who manifest certain behaviors, then it makes sense to look at those commonalities as causal (especially once a plausible mechanism can be identified), and to no longer treat those behaviors as "free". In most situations it doesn't make sense to look at each individual as unique and "free"...instead it makes sense to look at what is common accross individuals and assume the existence of a mechanism that accounts for those commonalities. And, if you want to improve things, to focus your ameleorative efforts to the mechanism, not to the individuals who are subject to it. Treat the disease, not the symptoms. The concept of individual moral responsibility isn't needed and serves no good purpose. The argument that we need the concept of moral responsibility lest society fall apart is the same as the argument that we need God and an afterlife to motivate good behavior. Individuals respond to incentives and deterrents. Get those right, and the system will work. Get those wrong and people will rationalize around morality anyway. All we need to justify some particular incentive or deterrent is: 1) It works. 2) We can't think of anything that would work better. Talk of moral responsibility and free will just serve to distract and confuse. If a policy can't be justified on the above two points, then adding moral responsibility and free will to the equation *still* won't justify it. If a policy *can* be justified on the above two points, then it should be implemented regardless of issues involving moral responsibility and free will. Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
