On 31 Aug 2011, at 18:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/31/2011 12:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't understand. I insist all the time that IF 3-we are machine
("yes doctor") then neither matter nor consciousness are computable/
Turing emulable. The 1-p is not even representable, although it is
meta-representable (by Bp & p, for example).
I think that is the confusing part. To say 'yes doctor' is to bet
that we (our brain) can be replaced by a computer (in some general
sense),
Yes.
but then you purport to show that 'we' are not computable. So even
what a (physical) computer does is not computable.
Well, to be an artificial brain, the physical computer has to do
something computable. But the physical part (body) of the computer,
when looked in details, has to result from a competition among
infinities of universal machines. But that is just the comp many-
worlds as seen through our angle/history/histories. This should be
apparent in step seven, no? Just take the first person indeterminacy
with UD* as domain. For your current computational state, there is an
infinity of computational story going in that state, run by infinities
of UMs. Your first person experience (including physical sensations)
is given by a sort of Gaussian on those histories. Normality comes the
high relative numbers of normal histories, perhaps by some
(arithmetical) phase randomization.
No doubt this is confusing. We start by assuming the brain is some
material machine, and we conclude in making that machine a limiting
idea in the universal mind looking at itself. But it is only
"logically" confusing if you take some primitive matter for granted.
It gives to physics a reason and a way to originate and evolve, and it
justifies the existence of the non communicable part of truth
(consciousness, notably).
Ask for any precision if needed (but note that from tomorrow to 9
september I have a lot of exams, so be perhaps patient).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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