Bruno, Hi. My responses are:
>Mathematical truth is in the mind of persons. And assuming we are machine, >mathematical truth is in the mind >of numbers relatively to numbers. Of course >we have to assume all elementary arithmetical truth, like "17 is ><prime". Do >you doubt them? Roger: When you say "Mathematical truth is in the mind of persons", this was the very point I was making. I don't think there can exist mathematical truths in some platonic realm somewhere. They're in the mind, which is a physical thing, and humans created them as a way of describing physical things. But, as you know, many physicists and others think that mathematical and physical laws exist independent of all else. When they can show us where they exist, I'll be willing to accept their argument. I'm not sure where you're getting that I don't accept truths like "17 is prime". I didn't say that. All I'm saying is that these truths don't have independent existence outside of everything else that exists. If the truths exist, they're just one part of the overall set of existent things that is what we're all trying to figure out. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >To ask that a number should be somewhere is a category error. Numbers are not >space-time object. It means >also that you assume space and time, which is a >more complex notion than numbers. Roger: See above. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >So, while nobody can disprove the existence of these things, we can't really >do much with them either it seems >to me. There just more of the things >people claim to exist but can provide no evidence for. However, I admit >that >I can also never directly prove my ideas about what used to be called >"non-existence" because no person >or minds would be present there. All we >can do is use our unprovable, but hopefully logical, hypotheses to >build >internally consistent models that are consistent with known facts and that >eventually can make testable >predictions. This is where I want to work >towards because otherwise, it's all just talk. >OK. But then you have to build a sufficiently precise theory, so that we can >criticize it. The problem with >nothingness is that it is, a priori, just a >word, indeed, and to make it precise requires some theory. For example, >the >quantum vacuum needs the quantum theory. The empty set needs set theory, 0 >needs number theory, etc. Roger: This is what I just said in the comment you were responding to. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >In regards to consciousness, I feel pretty much the same. Consciousness is >just the output of all the neurons, >neural circuits, ion gradients, etc. in >your brain. >This is extremely ambiguous. But from the UDP (the universal dovetailer >proof), or UDA UD Argument, >either the neurons, neural circuits, ion >gradients, etc. in your brain, are Turing emulable, and in this case >>physicalism is refuted, or there are not, in which case you are developing a >non mechanist theory (which is >something I respect, although I expect such >theories to be very complex one, and quite different from >everything we know >from observation and logic). Roger: How is this ambiguous? No one yet knows exactly the biochemical mechanisms that produce consciousness, but it's clear to most biochemists, at least, that consciousness is a product of the physical stuff inside the head. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >Again, if it's something else, I'd say: Show me where this consciousness/mind >is that's not in the brain. >It belongs, assuming mechanism, to the infinite number relations that you can >derive from addition and >multiplication alone. Roger: Hmm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >For trying to think of why there is something rather than nothing, I don't >think there can be any postulated >conscious observer other than some physical >property intrinsic to whatever existent state we're considering. > >Otherwise, >that doesn't explain where the observer comes from. >I am afraid you are begging the question by assuming something physical. Where >does *that* come from. >What is it. Mechanism can explain were both >matter/space/time, and subjectivity arise come from. They are >derived from >the addition and multiplication laws of natural numbers. The origin is not >direct, nor physical in >any sense, but is made possible by the >self-referential ability that some numbers display. The details of that >>explanation needs some amount of theoretical computer science. But the >argument showing the incompatibility >of mechanism and weak materialism (the >doctrine saying that primitive matter exists) is accessible to anyone >with >enough patience + a passive understanding of Church thesis. >You might try to understand the 8 steps proof given >>here http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Roger: I don't have time to read your whole paper, but from near the beginning, it looks like it's based on the comp idea which assumes arithmetical realism: "This is the assumption that arithmetical proposition, like ‘‘1+1=2,’’ or Goldbach conjecture, or the inexistence of a bigger prime, or the statement that some digital machine will stop, or any Boolean formula bearing on numbers, are true independently of me, you, humanity, the physical universe (if that exists), etc." As above, I'd say this is possible, but show me where these arithmetical propositions are that are independent of everything else. As you say, it's just another assumption. Overall, I don't think it really matters if it's physical stuff or mind, machine psychology, or arithmetical propositions that are the basis of our existence. Whatever it is that's the basis, it exists, and the whole point of this thread was about trying to figure out why it exists instead of not existing. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >Thanks. >You are welcome, Roger: Real nice there, dude. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
