On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:20, John Mikes wrote:
In the Bruno - Brent exchange I enjoyed Bruno''s remarks Usually I
agree with BrentM.
Probability (in my terms) means a distribution within infinite
bounds, no specifics for probable/non probable.
The 'fantasy-world' of physics is a time-related explanatory
Procrustean bed for those partly (maybe at all?)
understood phenomena that transpired (BY OBSERVATION - Bruno) till
'yesterday into our knowledge-base
(forget about oomniscient Comp).
It works "almost well" in circumstances we realize today. (Consider
some mishaps that occur,,,)
"Whole Physics" IMO is the conventional science we carry as of
yesterday. It includes the ancient 'facts' (measurements?)
ad their refutations by fantasy-land theories (Q-chapters) as well
as the modifications by math (another fantasy-land IMO.)
Granted: we travel in space, predict genetics, screw-up economics,
have societal predictions and ruin our environment
very successfully. We don't understand anything. Comp does (if it
exists) but it is not understandable to us. Logic? which
one? the Zarathustrian octimality(8)? or the equation of opposites?
(which is btw. a true outcome of the infinite everything).
I THINK (not sure!) self-reference is anchoring ourselves into our
ignorance.
Unfortunately we have no better means to contemplate with than our
material infested brain-function, a poor excuse for
mentality. Even the R.Rosen version infinite complexity worldview
(with a base of unknowable everything) is restricted to
our models made up of human-mind approved topics and features,
processes and happenings - an array of conventional
thinking. (I have no proof that the 'model-content' indeed
represents anything from the infinite complexity and its relations.)
BTW there is no proof at all. Only in a restricted limitational
view. Evidence: ditto.
So what do we have? a thinking agnosticism - acknowleged ignorance,
but we use it very skillfully.
Sorry to blunderize the holly Grail of science thinking.
I agree with all what you say here, John. Indeed the mechanist
assumption go far well in that direction. It extends it a lot, to be
sure, because you can replace "our human limitation" by our "Löbian
limitation", and this leads to a reversal of the aristotelian view of
reality into the older one by Plato, and developed by the rationalist
mystics, like Plato itself, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Plotinus, etc.
Comp might not be true, but it provides at least a quite different
rationalist picture of reality. Which is fun, OK?
Comp is the Salvia divinorum of rationalism :)
Bruno
On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the
problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable,
contradicting the observations.
I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can
prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out
to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory.
Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption,
which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide
conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by
predicting anything different for a repeatable experience.
If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be
refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole
physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory.
Depends on what you mean by "the whole of physics".
Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is
no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for
a fuzzy level of generality.
But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from,
and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the
observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have
mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable
truth would be geographical. But the logic of self-reference
explains why such logics does not collapse, and why there are
physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to
many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed
by most scientist).
What has been thought to be the "whole of physics" has been
refuted. Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general
relativity. General relativity is inconsistent with quantum
mechanics.
OK, I just answered this above.
So which "whole of physics" does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent
with the "physics" of computer games?
It is has to be consistent with the physics of "all computer games
played at once", as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons
observe a sort of average.
What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new
particle? A modified gravity?
This will remain the job of the usual physicist. Just that if we
assume mechanism, we have to understand its consequence.
To use mechanism to solve the "dark matter problem" is like to use
string theory to prepare tea.
We have already the logic of measure one.
I don't understand what measure there is on logics.
There is no measure on logics, but on sigma_1 sentences proofs.
There are logics of the measure *one*, and I have explained what it
is (mainly the logic of the intensional variant Bp & p (& Dt).
The explanation is quasi literal if you grasp UDA, and is
arithmetical (by AUDA).
If physics was newtonian or boolean, comp would be refuted already.
How would it be inconsistent with a Newtonian world?
With a newtonian world the logic of observable proposition is
boolean. It is already proved that the logic of the observable
proposition invariant for all UMs and LUMs cannot be boolean (and is
already proved to be a variant of von Neumann quantum logic).
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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