On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. >
The initial postulate is that the either MG set-up, or Maudlin's machine, instantiates an episode of consciousness in virtue of its computational states. The reductio demolishes the possibility of this being true "qua materia", because the relevant physical components have, in effect, been rendered impotent. So are you saying that, if one then accepts the additional postulate of matter-mechanism reversal, either of these two devices can indeed be considered to instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but "qua computatio" rather than "qua materia"? Or not? David > > On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight <joseph.9...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming >>> COMP, >>> consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. >>> Not >>> even a little. >> >> >> Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection >> that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph >> setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of >> physics-mechanism is actually accepted. Clearly, we now have to >> regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a >> deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is >> currently related. > > > OK. > > > >> But what are we now to make of the original >> proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an >> actual conscious state? After all, we don't regard them as >> "primitively physical" objects any longer, so we can't now apply the >> reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we? > > > I don't see why. We did bet on a comp substitution level. The "material > aspect" of the device will have to be retrieved from the infinitely many > computations going through our current state, but such a current state does > still exist by the initial assumption. > > > > >> They're part of the >> general computational state of affairs, like everything else. Is it >> that they instantiate the "wrong" sort of computation for >> consciousness, > > > Not all. Such matter is just very stable, and is supposed to implement the > right computation (at the right level), if not, then we would not accept the > digital brain. Comp is neutral on the nature of matter. > > > > >> because their physical behaviour is the result of >> "accidentally" contrived relations? > > > I am not sure I see your problem. The physical behavior becomes very well > founded by a statistics on infinitely many computations, a priori. The math > might one day refute comp, by showing that there are too much white rabbit, > but this is not yet the case. > > > > >> IOW, they're not really UM's in >> any relevant sense. > > > ? > There is UMs in two (related) sense. The UMs which are proved to exist (in > arithmetic), and then the "observable local UMs", who bodies emerge from the > competition between all UMs (in the preview sense) below their substitution > level. > > > > >> But then wouldn't the same argument for >> contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio? > > > Only in the case it appears that the comp matter is not stable enough to > provide stable computations, but the whole point has been to make that very > possibility testable. > > >> >> I'm puzzled. > > > David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> David >> >> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King >>>> <stephe...@charter.net> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi ACW, >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! >>>>> >>>>> On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), >>>>> that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's >>>>> try >>>>> and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: >>>>> >>>>> - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a >>>>> digital >>>>> substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to >>>>> implement/run >>>>> such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would >>>>> have a >>>>> continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? >>>>> >>>>> [SPK] >>>>> Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of "stuff" >>>>> with another such that the functionality (that allows for the >>>>> implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) >>>>> program >>>>> to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is >>>>> that >>>>> this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds >>>>> of >>>>> stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not >>>>> require >>>>> a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of >>>>> smoothly >>>>> morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. >>>>> B/c of >>>>> this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but >>>>> does >>>>> it really? >>>>> What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint from >>>>> the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" of >>>>> the >>>>> material world is more about properties that remain invariant under >>>>> sets of >>>>> symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like >>>>> "primitive" >>>>> substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be >>>>> a >>>>> wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that >>>>> to >>>>> test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be >>>>> derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I >>>>> am >>>>> trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that >>>>> COMP >>>>> is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of >>>>> space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant >>>>> and not >>>>> primitive. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it >>>>> has >>>>> to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter >>>>> time >>>>> to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, >>>>> that >>>>> whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role >>>>> in >>>>> consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. >>>>> So if >>>>> comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic >>>>> alone. >>>>> Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already >>>>> the >>>>> symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non >>>>> locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the >>>>> consistency: >>>>> the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter >>>>> cannot >>>>> use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum >>>>> up >>>>> the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the Bell-von Neuman answer >>>>> to >>>>> Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually >>>>> complete. >>>>> Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body >>>>> problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the >>>>> measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are >>>>> conceptually >>>>> complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable. >>>>> >>>>> Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it >>>>> from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your >>>>> primitive is the word "existence" which is not defined, nor even a >>>>> theory. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Bruno, >>>>> >>>>> You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a >>>>> problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from >>>>> an >>>>> internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many >>>>> different >>>>> internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. >>>>> This is >>>>> illustrated by the discussion of how "stuff" can vary while preserving >>>>> the >>>>> functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from neutral >>>>> monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it. >>>>> Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that >>>>> "COMP >>>>> is true" or "COMP is false". In order to have a coherent notion of a >>>>> bet, >>>>> both "COMP is True" and "COMP is false" have to exist side by side as >>>>> equivalently possible. >>>> >>>> >>>> [JK] >>>> Yet ""COMP is true" AND "COMP is false"" is necessarily false. >>>> >>>> Hi Joseph, >>>> >>>> I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a >>>> single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of " bracketing >>>> shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based theory >>>> and >>>> why one has to have something else in addition to propositions. This >>>> 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum logic as >>>> underlying structure. This latter possibility works because of the >>>> non-distributive nature of its logic but it requires additional >>>> structure to >>>> derive the Born postulate. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> If we consider that they only can have this "side by side equivalence" >>>>> in >>>>> the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is >>>>> dependent >>>>> on the choice, >>>> >>>> >>>> [JK] >>>> How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct bet. >>>> Just >>>> because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal credence, >>>> doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is coming from. >>>> >>>> [SPK] >>>> One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives and a >>>> selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a betting scheme >>>> to >>>> be possible. >>> >>> >>> >>> Ok, but how is the "truth value dependent on the choice"? >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the postulate >>>>> that >>>>> truth is independent of belief. We have to look at COMP from the point >>>>> of >>>>> view of many minds and not just one, but so far you have stoically >>>>> resisted >>>>> doing this. Why? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that >>>>> the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am >>>>> just a >>>>> curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, to >>>>> reinstall a physical realism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This makes no sense to me. QM disallows for any particular realism >>>>> in >>>>> the sense of property definiteness prior to observation. We do not need >>>>> to >>>>> go through all of the no-hidden-variable theorems again, I hope! In >>>>> fact, >>>>> the logic of QM is proven to not be faithfully capture in any one form >>>>> of >>>>> Boolean representation because it is only representable as an >>>>> Orthocomplete >>>>> Lattice. An OL is similar but not surjective to an infinite number of >>>>> Boolean Algebras and there does not exist a way to pick out one of them >>>>> in >>>>> an a priori way. There is also the isomorphism between any dualization >>>>> of a >>>>> finite vector space and between Hilbert spaces of the same # of >>>>> dimension >>>>> that shows this same property. >>>>> OTOH, we can use the SSA idea to pick out a Boolean algebra by >>>>> identifying some sub-lattice of the OL, but this only works if we have >>>>> many >>>>> observers, each with a set of local observables so that the collection >>>>> acts >>>>> like the questioners in a Surprise 20 Questions game. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and a >>>>> belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons: >>>>> a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that consciousness is >>>>> utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional / >>>>> organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point that >>>>> such a >>>>> principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not >>>>> correspond >>>>> to brain states and p. zombies. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical >>>>> parallelism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical physical >>>>> *is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is arithmetical >>>>> truth >>>>> see from the observable point of view (suggested to be handled by the >>>>> logics >>>>> of observation Bp & Dt (& p), at the G and G* levels). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But cannot you see that this claim that "there is no psycho-physical >>>>> parallelism" completely undermines the entire result? An illusion >>>>> cannot act >>>>> as a coherent substrate upon which representations can be implemented. >>>>> So in >>>>> effect you are denying the existence of the computer monitor with which >>>>> you >>>>> are reading this email, and the whiteboards upon which you write your >>>>> symbolic systems of equations and your eyes that read this and >>>>> everything >>>>> else that acts as a relatively stable substrate upon which one >>>>> arithmetic >>>>> truth can be compared to another. >>>> >>>> >>>> [JK] >>>> The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or >>>> "fundamental". >>>> >>>> >>>> [SPK] >>>> I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming >>> COMP, >>> consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. >>> Not >>> even a little. >>> >>>> >>>> What you need to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to be, >>>> for it to be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be able >>>> to be >>>> generated or implemented somehow, >>>> >>>> otherwise it is much like a concept that cannot be communicated or >>>> known. >>>> Would it even be a concept? >>> >>> >>> >>> ????? >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer observes >>>> several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong proton mass, >>>> broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He then reasonably >>>> concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he reduces his experience >>>> in >>>> the dream to a "more fundamental" physical reality wherein he is asleep, >>>> his >>>> brain is in state X, and so on. He is therefore denying the >>>> primitiveness of >>>> his dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion. >>>> >>>> [SPK] >>>> This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be known to >>>> contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of experiences >>>> which >>>> are a standard of correctness against which the content of the dream can >>>> deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences another world except for that >>>> "physics violating" version it would never know and would accept it as >>>> "real", in fact it would have no reason to consider that it might be >>>> "unreal". >>> >>> >>> >>> I agree. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> [JK] >>>> It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is >>>> dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever >>>> legitimately >>>> say "I am dreaming". If I see a cup of coffee getting hotter on a cold >>>> day, >>>> or have conversations with long-dead relatives, I cannot say that I am >>>> dreaming, because if I am dreaming then there is no reason to take my >>>> reasoning seriously. (A lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!) >>>> >>>> Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is a somewhat subtle issue. >>>> >>>> [SPK] >>>> >>>> No, you are making a good point. My comment in response is that such >>>> a >>>> situation requires the ability to distinguish alternatives as well as >>>> the >>>> possibility of "being in" or "finding oneself in" alternatives. >>> >>> >>> >>> OK, but would you affirm or reject the statement "One cannot legitimately >>> say 'I am dreaming'"? If you affirm it, you would be consistent with what >>> you have said about the UDA, but I think you would be incorrect for >>> obvious >>> reasons. If you deny it then either you are being inconsistent or I have >>> misunderstood you. >>> >>>> >>>> Comp covers this with the cut and paste idea and shows how 1p >>>> indeterminism works. My only difficulty with COMP is the eliminatist >>>> interpretation of it. One has to have real alternative states that >>>> co-exist >>>> at the level level even if they support propositions that are mutually >>>> contradictory. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is >>>>> singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of >>>>> arithmetic >>>>> truths and for this to be possible there has to be a relatively stable >>>>> substrate. There is no escape from this necessity. >>>> >>>> >>>> [JK] >>>> How do you know this? >>>> >>>> >>>> [SPK] >>>> >>>> OK, lets reason our way through this. How exactly does one Arithmetic >>>> Truth act upon another such that there is a difference between a pair of >>>> non-interacting ATs and a pair of interacting ATs. To be consistent, we >>>> cannot project the ATs into and onto entities that have the per-assumed >>>> possibility of interaction or not, we have to take them as primitive. >>>> Does >>>> this construction even make sense? No! If we force it then we find >>>> ourselves, as evaluators of those ATs, in a quandary much like Descartes >>>> with his version of dualism. How does the mental and material interact? >>>> I >>>> claim, with Vaughn Pratt, that they do not interact at all! A better >>>> question, asked by Pratt, is how can a pair of minds or propositions >>>> interact? >>> >>> >>> >>> I'm afraid I don't understand what you're saying, but I will look at >>> Pratt's >>> stuff. Like I mentioned, I can't read them at full comprehension just >>> yet. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism holds. >>>>> A >>>>> dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of "separate >>>>> substances", it is proposed that the logical and the physical are two >>>>> distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel >>>>> tracks. As >>>>> Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the >>>>> physical >>>>> processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite >>>>> directions. >>>>> Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory diagram >>>>> of >>>>> this duality: >>>>> >>>>> ---- > X -----> Y -----> >>>>> | | >>>>> <----- A <------B <----- >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualisms >>>>> contained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between >>>>> "intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It does reverse >>>>> the >>>>> arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism, or >>>>> anti-parallelism, >>>>> though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical. Then the qualia, and the >>>>> first person plural quanta, are given by the machine's semantics for >>>>> the >>>>> logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an >>>>> informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to comprehend it >>>>> from >>>>> just your discussion of the hypostases. >>>> >>>> >>>> [JK] >>>> I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a little >>>> technical, either. >>>> >>>> [SPK] >>>> I am hopeful that Bruno will see the benefit in writing this >>>> description up. >>>> >>>> Onward! >>>> >>>> Stephen >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Joseph Knight >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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