On 14 Feb 2012, at 18:53, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 13, 5:17 pm, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
Digital substitution
is not a local symmetry.
hence flight simulators do not fly.
That's very funny, Peter.
That reminds us of a quite good typical comp exercise: can a virtual
typhoon makes you wet? Related here to "Can you flight with a
computer?".
Let me ask a question to Stephen. I think I know the answer of all
participants on this, I think, except for Stephen, where I am less sure.
The question is: do you agree with the, now common and rather obvious
comp answer to that exercise.
The comp answer is "yes you can be made wet by a virtual typhoon, but
you have to virtualize yourself, or more precisely you need only to
virtualize your skin-interfaces with the virtual typhoon.
Stephen, do you agree with this? Do you agree that with comp, we can
in principle, make you feel like being under a tempest, by virtue of
running a computer in room. Craig would clearly answer that this is
not possible, given that for him, comp is not possible in the first
place. But you acknowledge that you believe in comp, or that you can
assume it, or at least that you do not assume that comp is false. But
my question does not bear on the truth or falsity of comp, but on the
experience of feeling wet by Stephen King in case his brain has been
digitalized and interfaces in a virtual environment of the kind
tempest. Do you agree that if comp is correct then Stephen King has
experienced the quite physical-material experience of being quite wet
due to violent raining winds in a tempest. OK?
If you agree with this we can proceed step by step, and perhaps, jump
quickly to step 8, the MGA-Maudlin stuff, which is at the heart of the
difficulty of linking consciousness to the physical objects, unless,
like Craig, you abandon comp and you make both consciousness and the
physical infinitely complex. That prevents indeed the unavoidable
metaphysical dissociation brought by betting on a substitution level.
Bruno
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.