On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's
English papers and participated in these discussions, at least. You
do not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)
The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the
existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument
follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that there
still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that is
possible *in principle*, I just direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm
which merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is
given to you if MWI happens to be true).
Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of
thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions
that might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the idea
of a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences of
lottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The main
problem is that one has no control at all over which numbers will
pop up, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers after
they have "rolled into the basket".
This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals
are embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.
If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you
consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM
being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't
know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to
someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out
for ourselves).
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the
possibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing
Machine. It would be helpful if we first established that a Turing
Machine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am
pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I have
studied of QM and its implications. For example, one has to consider
the implications of the Kochen-Specker and Gleason Theorems - since
we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!
We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning,
it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.
All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence
has occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world
to obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion
that assume the physical world to be completely classical therefore
it assumes a model of Reality that is not true.
Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality is
assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we use the
neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and that
assumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forget that
Quantum reality is Turing emulable.
The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of
infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either
way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or
just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that there
is no subst. level.
No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are
presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea
of primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to
discuss ideas and not straw men with me.
This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having a
physical reality to communicate about numbers.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
