On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's English
papers and participated in these discussions, at least. You do not
need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)
The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the
existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument
follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that there
still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that is
possible *in principle*, I just direct you at
www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm which merely
requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to you if
MWI happens to be true).
Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of
thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions
that might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the idea
of a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences of
lottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The main
problem is that one has no control at all over which numbers will pop
up, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers after they
have "rolled into the basket".
This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals
are embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.
If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you
consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM
being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't
know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to
someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out for
ourselves).
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It
would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is
capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well
convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM and
its implications. For example, one has to consider the implications
of the Kochen-Specker
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/> and Gleason
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - since
we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!
We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning,
it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.
All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence has
occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world to
obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion that
assume the physical world to be completely classical therefore it
assumes a model of Reality that is not true.
Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality is
assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we use the
neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and that
assumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forget that
Quantum reality is Turing emulable.
Dear Bruno,
I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from the
infinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What we observe
must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could not have
consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute? My question is looking at
how we extend the absolute space and time of Newton to the Relativistic
case such that observers always see physical laws as invariant to their
motions, for the COMP case this would be similar except that observer
will see arithmetic rules as invariant with respect to their
computations. (I am equating computations with motions here.)
The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of
infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either
way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or
just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that there
is no subst. level.
No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are
presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea of
primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to discuss
ideas and not straw men with me.
This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having a
physical reality to communicate about numbers.
OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely against my
intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem. Do you
have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theorem seems to
indicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standard model of
arithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the same way that the
speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics?
My motivation for this is that the identity - the center of one's
sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures is always
excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of the integers
result from the constant (that would make one's model of arithmetic
non-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wording is terrible,
but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it up as I learn better.
Onward!
Stephen
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