On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:45, R AM wrote:
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate
spaghetti because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you
think you could have done otherwise?
Now, let's suppose a gangster decides to rob a bank after
considering all his options. Later he might be judged and told that
"he could have done otherwise"? Could he really have done otherwise?
At the level of the arithmetical laws, or physical laws, the answer
is no. But we don't live at that level, so at the level of its first
person impression the answer is yes.
OK. So that means that if you (or the ganster) were put again in
exactly the same subjective situation (same beliefs, likings,
emotions, intentions, memories, same everything) you could do
otherwise?
No. But the gangster does not know this determination. So although at
that level he could not do otherwise, from his perspective, it still
can make genuine sense that he could have done otherwise, from our
embedded pov perspective. Only for God, it does not make sense, but
locally we are not God.
More specifically. You are in a situation where you crave for
spaghetti, you haven't had spaghetti in the last month, you know
spaghetti is good for er ... whatever. You therefore make the
decision to eat spaghetti. Now, you are put again in exactly the
same situation and ... do you really think you could choose
strawberries instead? would you choose strawberries?
If I am craving spaghetti I could not do otherwise. But then I would
not have said it. The situation is when I remember having hesitate,
and the day after, despite the determination, I can think that I could
have done otherwise, because I cannot be aware of the complete
determination. And, indeed, after that hesitation, I might well have
taken the strawberry.
Determinism is just not incompatible with genuine "free will" or
"will", for the will is not playing at the same level than the
determination. If they were on the same level, you could trivially
justify all your act by "I am just obeying the physical laws", which
is just false, because you are an abstract person, not a body.
A guy rapes and tortures 10 children, could he have done otherwise?
Well, there is a sense for some medical expert to say that he could
have done otherwise, for the guy is judged responsible and not under
some mental disease (for example). Now, if the guy defends himself
in saying that he was just obeying to the physical laws, he will
convince nobody, and rightly so.
He will convince nobody because we all believe that he (and all of
us) could have done otherwise. And we all believe that because, for
some reason, we believe it is unfair to punish someone if he cannot
do otherwise. What I'm saying is that belief in free-will is just a
justification for punishing people.
OK. And rightly so, unless unfair trial of course.
But in fact, we punish people, not because "he could have done
otherwise" but because next time, he will think twice.
Actually this is not proved, and some argue that going in jail can
augment the probability of recurrence of certain type of crime. But
that's not relevant. So OK.
Next time, he will not be in the same subjective situation: he will
have the memories of his punishment and he will take that into
account.
He learned "to do otherwise".
If next time he is in exactly the same subjective situation, he will
do exactly the same. Why would he do otherwise? Why didn't he already?
The point is not that he is determinate, but that he is aware of his
non knowledge of determination, making him capable to think correctly
that he might have done otherwise; perhaps having a slight change of
state of mind, or awaken in different mood, or any detail he knows
that he did not know.
Sometimes, we might become aware of the reason which might have invite
us to do otherwise, so we prepare ourselves better for the future
hesitation.
Let's suppose that a person forgets everything every morning. Would
it make any sense to punish someone like that, because he just could
have done otherwise?
Someone like that must go to an hospital, be cured, and then can be
judged responsible or not. It can depend on many factors. There are no
general rules, nor any scientific criteria for judging with any
certainty the responsibility.
We are determinate, but we cannot known completely our
determination, so from our point of view there is a genuine spectrum
of different possibilities and we can choose "freely" among them. It
does not matter that a God, or a Laplacean daemon can predict our
actions, for *we* can't, and have no other choice than choosing
without complete information, and in some case it makes sense that
we could have made a different choice (even if that is senseless at
the basic ontological level, for the choice is made at another
level, from an internal first person perspectives.
But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact,
about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot
imagine ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still
think that we could have done otherwise.
But "exactly the same subjective experience" is ambiguous. Our doing
depends also on unconscious processing, of the luminosity of the sky,
of possible subliminal messages from peers, of hormone concentration,
and all those factors might be unknown. Then determination does not
prevent free will, because we don't live at the level of such
determination. That is why we can hesitate, and we can easily
imagine, in some situation, that we might have done otherwise, the
circumstances being slightly different---with us not necessarily aware
of the difference at time.
Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly the same
subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but
If yes, why?
We can't. Given your condition. But the determination being unknown,
we can correctly conceive of having done otherwise, for a little
unknown reason which would have influence the choice made after some
hesitation. Even without hesitation, there is still, even more, free
will. That God can predict I will take a cup of tea, does not change
the fact that I will take it willingly (and responsibly, respectfully,
etc.)
In the modal logic, this is well explained. The "divine
intellect" (G*) knows that 1p = 3p, but neither the 3p machine, nor
the 1p subject can know that equivalence, and thus they obey different
logics.
Bruno
To justify our acts by God Will or by Physical Laws (or Arithmetical
laws) is the same type of level confusion, or perspective confusion,
mistake. I would say.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
