On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 4:27:29 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: >> >> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI >> > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a >> > new topic. >> > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality >> > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible >> > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned >> > about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only >> > solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the >> > idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering >> > how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being >> > resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as >> > the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new >> > subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear >> > they are you), or is the new subject really you? >> > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself >> > the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected >> > should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might >> > have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my >> > memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes >> > even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain >> > atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- >> > dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity >> > of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since >> > there is no physical continuity at all. >> > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, >> > resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all >> > memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and >> > reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the >> > future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain >> > is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following >> > this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the >> > division between subjects is not absolute. What separates >> > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the >> > computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious >> > 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to >> > one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner >> > of a specific physical brain). >> > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's >> > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must >> > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every >> > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the >> > UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of >> > morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they >> > *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge >> > of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change >> > the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, >> > wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since >> > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of >> > every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can >> > only steal from yourself. >> >> I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong >> to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition >> true but capable of becoming false if justified "too much", like all >> protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, >> etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions". >> >> Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, >> BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others >> what you don't want the others do to you", but "don't do to the others >> what *the others* don't want you do to them". >> In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult >> "No Thanks". (It is more complex with the children, you must add >> nuances like "as far as possible"). >> >> >> I don't know what G* and G are, but I get the gist, and I agree. In fact, > questions like how to deal with punishment become interesting when > considered through this 'one subject' lens. When 'I' am the offender, I > don't want to be punished for my crimes, but 'I' as the victim and the > broader community think the offender should be. We have to balance > competing views. Also, there is sense in looking after oneself ahead of > others to the extent that I of all people am best equipped to look after my > own needs, and I have the same rights to happiness, material wellbeing etc > as others. The question is, what course of action brings the greatest good > if all adopt it as their moral code? It's no use everybody giving away all > their worldly goods to charity - there will be no-one to receive them! > >> >> >> > Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one >> > sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the >> > receiving end of all actions, both good and bad. >> >> This is true from outside, but not from inside, where the good/bad is >> relative to you, and you can change the proportion of good and bad in >> your accessible neighborhoods. And it is obligatory like that by comp, >> making moral locally sense-full. >> >> Looking at the big picture for the moral is as much senseless as >> justifying a murder by referring to the obedience to the physical >> laws. It does not work because we precisely don't usually live in the >> big picture. We are locally embed in it, and that plays the key local >> role for any practical matter. >> >> Yes, of course, and I made this exact point in relation to free will and > determinism. One should not mix up levels. But I think there is still a > distinction in perspectives if all things occur as opposed to only some. If > the range of experiences that occur is finite, then my actions one way or > another will change the sum total of happiness in the experiences I will > have as the universal subject, whereas in an 'everything happens' model, I > may still have grounds for moral action, but knowing I go through > everything anyway seems to make the case for altruism a little less > compelling! Mind you (and this is my gripe with comp as an explanatory > framework), it is never clear in an infinite field what local conditions > might apply. Perhaps we live in a universe created by an old testament god > who thinks its an abomination for a man to lie with a man or to eat goat's > flesh on Wednesdays. Such a possibility cannot be excluded because of the > infinite calculation depth of the UD - indeed somewhere in a universe just > like ours, that is the case! > > > OK, but we belong to all universe at once (among those who reaches our > computational states), never in one universe. You have to manage the > statistics. So our choice, with respect to our most probable universal > neighboors/computation, can change our proportion of accessible internal > universes, and altruism/egoism makes sense. > > Ah yes, I'd lost sight of that detail.
> That is why you take the lift instead of jumping out of the window. That > is why some people quit smoking. > > Bruno, it may be why *you* don't jump out the window. But most people aren't thinking about their proportion of accessible universes when they take the stairs! > We have partial control satisfying some ego (splitted in many > "conflictual" povs, right at the start) > > Bruno > > > > > > Bruno >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/PjX-xb0aCoAJ. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/3rY-6yIymUgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
