On 17 Jun 2012, at 16:54, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 16, 2012  meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> I don' believe in this spirit theory anyway; I was just trying to show it was a testable theory.

I have never understood why things are supposed to become less self- contradictory in the "spirit world" than in our world or how spirit theory is somehow fundamentally different from physical theory. If "spirit" caused X and X caused Y then both X and Y came into existence by a deterministic process. As for spirit itself there are only two possibilities, spirit came into existence for a reason or it did not, and you can say exactly the same thing about an electron.

Spirit and matter are data we want to explain. We have the appearance of both and we try to relate them in a consistent way. We can perhaps agree that consciousness-here-and-now is the only truth we know which seems undoubtable, so it might be more easy to explain the illusion of matter to consciousness than the illusion of consciousness to a piece of matter. If we accept that mind is basically information handling/computation, then a mind is confronted to the first person indeterminacy and the illusion of matter has to be recovered from that.

The spirit realm is just arithmetic, with comp, given that you can prove in arithmetic the existence of all dreams (assuming comp), and that physics is only the way some dreamers see some (sharable, first person plural) deep (long) computations.




> Of course if you take Bruno's view then you risk making materialism an untestable theory, since no matter what result you can say,"Well it must be due to a deeper physical phenomenon."

I don't see why it *MUST* be due to a deeper physical phenomenon; nearly every physicists alive says some things have no cause

You might provide references. The "collective hallucination" of the collapse of the wave has, in his time, resuscitated that idea, but it does not make any sense, and is not necessary, as Everett showed.




and I can think of no obvious reason why what they say MUST be untrue,

They are not even wrong. Event without reason might exist but cannot be invoked to explain anything. To invoke them as such is just equivalent with "I dunno and will never know". The "will ever know" is too much. It means "don't ask".

Now first person appearance of randomness can have a reason, like in the self-duplication, or with incompressibility.



so I'm pretty sure they're probably right. I said I couldn't think of a reason but of course I could believe in mystical crap for no reason whatsoever, lots and lots of people do exactly that, but apparently something has caused me not to follow them and embrace the unreasoned life. And testable or not of one thing I am certain, materialism is true or it is not; although I may never know which it MUST nevertheless be true that everything happens for a reason or it does not. And I really don't think any of this is rocket science.

We can know things, like if mechanism is true then materialism is false (or true in an trivial epinoumenic sense, which means contradicting occam).

As I said, it is more easy to explain the illusion of matter to consciousness than the illusion of consciousness to matter. And comp makes just this utterly precise, when you take the time to do the reasoning.

Bruno




  John K Clark




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