On 19 Jun 2012, at 17:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/19/2012 12:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jun 2012, at 00:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/18/2012 2:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Brent, Stephen,
On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable,
introduced a separation between me and not me, and the "not
me" below my substitution level get stable and persistent by
the statistical interference between the infinitely many
computations leading to my first person actual state.
How does on computation interfere with another? and how does
that define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective
agreement with other streams of thought?
Brent
They interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy on
UD* (or arithmetic).
That still seems very vague. I can suppose that many computations
go thru the same or similar sequences which later branch and so
have indeterminant futures. But is that 'interference'?
Sure. Of course a priori it is not wave like, for the probabilities
add only, untilm you take the self-reference constraint into
account, which leads to the arithmetical quantization, which
imposes a quantum logic on the consistent extensions.
To quick for me. Is this spelled out somewhere.
In most of my papers. I think I describe the quantization in sane04.
You have to study a bit of mathematical logic. The quantization of p
is given mainly by [] <> p, with the [] p = Bp & Dt, and B Gödel's
provability predicate. You have to restrict p to the sigma_1
propositions. We can come back on this.
And why should it produce any "me", "not me" boundary?
It does not. "personal identity" is an illusion due to disconnected
memories,
But they are not 'disconnected'. It's their connectedness that is
essential to the 'illusion'.
I was talking about the memories of different individuals.
and correct self-reference. The me/not me is just explained by the
diagonalisation: if Dx gives xx, DD gives DD.
Again, does not explain it to me.
It makes possible to have program defined in term of their own code.
It solves the conceptual difficulties described by Descartes and
Driesch about life. I used it to implement "planarias" (self-
regenerating programs, or collection of programs). It explains self-
reference at least in the technical sense that it provides the tools
to handle self-reproduction, and self-reference. It is *the* tool in
proving the arithmetical completeness of the logic of self-reference G
and G*. It gives a precise mathematical notion of self, defined
relatively to a universal number/machine/probable-neighboor.
You can use it to show that there is no possible algorithm for the
stopping problem. Just define the following "duplicator D"
Dx = if stop(xx) then continue, else stop.
Then "stop" fails on DD:
DD = if stop(DD) then continue, else stop.
I can give a more formal view with the phi_i, or with the W_i, but the
basic idea is very simple. It starts the whole subject on
(arithmetical) self-reference.
A good introductory paper is
SMORYNSKI, C., 1981, Fifty Years of Self-Reference in Arithmetic,
Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic, Vol. 22, n° 4, pp. 357-374.
Bruno
And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream of
thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.
Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question
here that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly
how do computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each
other within an immaterialist scheme?
By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computer
science in arithmetic.
There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more on
this on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system,
you get them all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause
with the notion of universal (or not) machine. Some existing
number relation implements all the possible relations between all
possible universal machine.
You have to study the detail of Gödel's proof, or study Kleene's
predicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For
the non materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, the
problem is not having too much of them.
Exactly. It's the problem of having proved too much. To say all
computations can exist and if consciousness is computation then
all conscious thoughts will exist is true but meaningless - like
tautologies are.
It is not tautological because we can test if there are too much
computations and if they obey quantum logic or not, so it is
certainly not tautological. You forget that the laws of physics are
given by the statistics on those computations.
Bruno
Brent
Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not a
solution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmetical
quantization to test test the quantum tautologies.
We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantum
computer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside all
computations.
Bruno
Might it be that 'subjective agreement" between streams of
thought is just another form of what computer science denotes as
bisimulation (except that it is not a timeless platonic version
of it)?--
Onward!
Stephen
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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