On 17 Aug 2012, at 01:43, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 05:06:31PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Aug 2012, at 09:12, Russell Standish wrote:
Why would this be any different with random number generators? A
coin
flips, and I do something based on the outcome. It is not my choice
(except insofar as I chose to follow an external random event). My
brain makes a random choice based on the chaotic amplification of
synaptic noise. This is still my brain and my choice.
So you identify yourself with a brain, like Searle. With comp I
would say that only a person makes choice, the solid material brain
is already a construct from an infinity of random choice, but none
can be said to mine, like if I found myself in Moscow instead of
Washington after a WM-duplication, I can't say that I have chosen to
be in Moscow.
Via supervenience, yes. I'm not sure this is particularly Searle's
position, though - I disagree with his diagnosis of the Chinese room,
and rather follow Dennett in that.
... stuff elided, because we're in agreement ...
I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to
do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else
can
predict my behavior does not make it less "free".
Um, yes it does.
Why?
Why would I be less free to eat blueberries in case everybody can
predict that I will eat them.
In the case everybody could predict that, then I would be able to
predict it, and I would feel less free as a result.
OK. I am no sure I agree. It is the point of disagreement. I can
predict that I will take coffee each morning, but I do it freely, with
minor exception (sometimes I do take tea instead, which gives sense to
the fact that it is a constant free morning choice, as I am never
entirely sure of what I will take. I don't see opposition between
predictable and free-will, except that from the first person view we
are confronted with some spectrum. In fact people vindicated free will
in particular circumstance often say "I am determined to do this or
that". Free-will is basically self-determination in front of a choices
spectrum. It is not a big deal, and I can easily throw the notion for
will, responsibility, etc.
I agree on the rest of your post, and so, don't comment either.
Bruno
In the case where some super intelligent observer could predict my
actions, but I could not, and wasn't aware of the super intelligent
observer's predictions, then we have an interesting case. I can't say
whether I would feel less free in that situation or not. Alas, its a
bit hard to perform the experiment.
I don't think Libet-like experiments count - a machine capable of
reading my decision before I become aware of my decision still does
not evacuate the proposition that I freely made the decision. I do
understand its a bit freaky, though...
You did not reply my question: take the iterated
WM-self-duplication. All the resulting people lives the experience
of an random oracle. Why would they be more free than someone
outside the duplication boxes? How could they use that random
oracle
for being more free than someone not using them, as they cannot
select the outcome?
In the setup of your teleporters, the source of randomness comes
from
outside of the person, so no, that doesn't have anything to with
free
will. But if you move the source of randomness to inside somehow,
then
sure it might do.
I don't see what inside and outside have anything to do with the
fact that a choice can't be helped with a random coin. A choice is
driven by many factors like my personality, my culture, my life, my
current appetite, and thousand of parameters.
Sure, and also by completely random factors. If you only made
completely random choices, it wouldn't seem like execising free will
at all. One can perform this experiment, although curiously,
humans make poor random number generators, statistically speaking.
I don't see how my form of free will is non-comp.
With comp everything is deterministic from the 3p view, like
arithmetical truth is definite.
Then from the 1-view, there are mainly two type of indeterminacy.
The one due to self-multiplication in UD* (alias arithmetical
truth), which, as you agree above can't play a role in free-will.
Then there is the self-indeterminacy based on Turing, which is the
one playing a role in free-will. But in both case, there is no
indeterminacy in the big picture. If free-will necessicate a real
3p-free will, comp would be false, as we cannot Turing emulate it.
Definitely not. Free will is not a 3p (aka syntactic level)
concept. To say it is would be a confusion of levels, or a category
error, putting it bluntly.
The QM indeterminacy cannot work here, as it is a
self-multiplication like in the first person indeterminacy.
By contrast, your
UD argument seems to argue for its necessary appearance.
Yes.
Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per
se,
but I would imagine that someone implementing an agent that must
survive in a messy real world environment (eg an autonomous robot)
will need to consider this issue, and build something like it into
their robot.
Probabilist algorithm can be more efficacious and can solve problem
that deterministic algorithm cannot, but in most case you can use
pseudo-random one in most case. And if consciousness and free will
necessitates a real 3p indeterminacy, then comp is violated, as this
cannot be Turing emulated.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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