Wouldn't that alternative be one in which there are only a finite number of possible
persons?...e.g. materialism.
Bren
On 8/30/2012 7:49 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian
perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a
existence a non-zero measure.
Terren
On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the
infinite computations going through my state". Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.
Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.
You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we
might as well think of it's computations as completed.
I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't
exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still
exists.
Brent
Terren
On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential
infinities.
Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any
given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations
that
will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you".
Brent
On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.
Terren
Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite
computations.
So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is
very
small, but non-zero. But we already knew that.
Brent
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