On 30 Aug 2012, at 06:21, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the
infinite computations going through my state". Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

OK. All what counts should be the relative measure. In some state, some continuations should have a bigger measure, and this should correspond to "more computations going in your current states, and the most probable next one.




Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.

You may be right.  I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia,

Well, with comp Platonia is just a tiny part of arithmetical truth, and the UD exists there in some provable way. We don't need to think this to make it true.



then we might as well think of it's computations as completed.

OK.


I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists.

But this mixes different questions. Computations involving PI might have, from the first person machine's point of view, a high measure, in case the "circle idea-program" get some relatively local crucial rĂ´le (as it is very probable, as the circle is a key in many part of number theory, and elsewhere).

Bruno




Brent


Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that
will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you".

Brent


On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren

Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations.
So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is
very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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