On 24 Sep 2012, at 13:03, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Bruno,
With components I mean a neutral enumeration of entities. perhaps
lebnitzian monads would be more appropriate.
Besides numbers + and * I think that is necessary machines or any
kind of instruction set + an execution unit? . It isn't?
You don't need this. You can define instruction sets and execution
units with numbers and the + and * laws. That was Gödel did in his
1931 paper, and it is the root of theoretical computer science.
Arithmetic implicitly defines all computations, and for the first
person indeterminacy, those implicit definitions are enough to explain
the orogin of the physical sensations and theories.
Bruno
2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
This is my schema.
Can you complete/ammend it?
Things in themselves (noumena) -> - Have a computational nature
(Bruno) : few components: numbers, + *
OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and
multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete
ontology.
I would not described the numbers has components, though, because
this could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might
be made of numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of
how what exist epistemologically emerges (through complex number
relations and their epistemological content which can be shown to
exists once we assume computationalism).
Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature
(addition and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not,
as arithmetical truth is not computable at all, and will play an
important role in the emergence of the epistemological reality. In
particular, the internal epistemological realities will have many
non computable features, like machines and programs have too).
- Is just
a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations
- Are
Monadic (Roger). many components
- Are
phisical: includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons,
cars. (physicalists)
Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the
mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that
keep
entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of
natural selection
Therefore,
existence is selected (Me)
Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can
understand "relies on the architecture of the mind" (the dreams of
the universal number), but what is a brain? what is time, space,
nature?
- The mind is
a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection-
(Bruno)
The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of
computation among an infinity of computations.
- Are created
by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger)
- Does not
matter (physicalists)
Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe
that the mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to
justify this, or to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp,
they are inconsistent (as shown normally by the UD Argument).
I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person
indeterminacy into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ?
Bruno
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in
arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like
[]Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence
contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on
human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through
you here.
Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such
existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the
stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered
as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very
definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say
"yes" to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain).
That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology
contains the physics as a subpart).
Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It
must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply
insufficient for this task.
First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are.
And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the
hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define
a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is
natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it
is the same for us by default in all religion).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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