On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 2:21:30 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of >> view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some >> theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. >> >> > This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for > granted. How can experience itself be simulated? > > > The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, > neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of > thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. > > > Hi Craig and Bruno, > > If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* > the experience. >
That's what I am saying. Nothing is being simulated, there is only a direct experience (even if that experience is a dream, which is only a simulation when compared to what the dream is not). Bruno said that the brain simulates experience, but it isn't clear what it is that can be more authentic than our own experience. > I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that > Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. > > > I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, > > > Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much > literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate the > context making the experience of the person, "really living in Platonia" > possible to manifest itself locally. > > > We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within > another? > Right. > > > but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience > itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead > be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, > on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If > the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those > neurotransmitters and cells? > > > It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its > most probable computation. > > > There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of > computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological > space) aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a > "separate substance". > > > > Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business > producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it > isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. > > > The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost > the complementary of computations. > > > Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. > I don't think computations can generate anything. Only things can generate other things, and computations aren't things, they are sensorimotive narratives about things. I say no to enumeration without presentation. > > That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that > "anti-computation" and compare to physics. > > > But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. What > we get is an infinite "landscape" of possible physics theories. > This makes me think... if Comp were true, shouldn't we see Escher like anomalies of persons whose computations have evolved their own personal exceptions to physics? Shouldn't most of the multi-worlds be filled with people walking on walls or swimming through the crust of the Earth? Craig > > > Bruno > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/qZgziFPAz8UJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
