On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal > > > I think if you converse with a real person, he has to > have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. BRUNO: Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I talk to him by giving him a virtual body in a virtual environnement. I can also, in principle talk with only its brain, by sending the message through the hearing peripherical system, or with the cerebral stem, and decoding the nervous path acting on the motor vocal cords. ROGER: I forget what my gripe was. This sounds OK. > > As to conversing (interacting) with a computer, not sure, but > doubtful: > for example how could it taste a glass of wine to tell good wine > from bad ? BRUNO: I just answered this. Machines becomes better than human in smelling and tasting, but plausibly far from dogs and cats competence. ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. > Same is true of a candidate possible zombie person. BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Bruno > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/20/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-19, 14:09:59 > Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p > > > On 18 Oct 2012, at 20:05, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell >> by trying to converse with it. If it can >> converse, it's got a mind of its own. > > I agree with. It has mind, and its has a soul (but he has no "real" > bodies. I can argue this follows from comp). > > When you attribute 1p to another, you attribute to a "shell" to > manifest a soul or a first person, a knower. > > Above a treshold of complexity, or reflexivity, (L?ianity), a > universal number get a bigger inside view than what he can ever see > outside. > > Bruno > > > > > > >> >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 10/18/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 >> Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p >> >> >> On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: >> >>> Hi Bruno >>> >>> Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity >> >> OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs >> some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part >> of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical >> reality. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 10/17/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: Alberto G. Corona >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 >>> Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" >>> rather than"is" >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal >>> >>> >>> On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >>> >>> >>> 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : >>> >>> >>> On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >>> >>> >>> It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. >>> >>> The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made >>> of >>> zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in >>> the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act >>> in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, >>> after >>> that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be >>> good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any >>> surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist >>> epistemology. >>> >>> However there are people that believe these strange things. Some >>> autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths >>> too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic >>> epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies >>> with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of >>> evolutionary epistemology. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. >>> >>> I don't bet or believe in solipsism. >>> >>> But you were saying "that a *conscious* robot" can lack a soul. See >>> the >>> quote just below. >>> >>> That is what I don't understand. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any >>> existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what >>> is only belief based on ?onjectures. >>> >>> It can go no further than ?"cogito ergo sum" >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 >>> person points in only one of them (the "feeler, probably). Only the >>> feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the >>> machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living >>> solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist >>> doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can >>> feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others >>> and other things. >>> >>> >>> That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have >>> to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational >>> and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being >>> humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that >>> this is a matter of faith or not. >>> ? >>> I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal : >>> >>> >>> >>> On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >>> >>> >>> But still after this reasoning, ? doubt that the self conscious >>> philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I >>> have. >>> >>> >>> ? >>> >>> You mean it is a zombie? >>> >>> I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the >>> universal >>> one. >>> So I am not sure what you mean by soul. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Alberto. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Alberto. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Alberto. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the 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