STEPHEN: Hi Richard,
How does Vafa explain the stability/instability of compactified
dimensions? My chief worry is that all of the stringy and loopy theories
assume a pre-existing continuum of space-time of some sort, the very
Aristotelian "substance" idea that Bruno's argument successfully
attacks. The assumption of primitive substances is very problematic as
it does not allow for any room for consciousness to occur or be causally
effective. I do like the idea of hyper-EM fluxes, but am not so sure
that they are anything more than fancy math, fiber bundles and sheaf
transform groups on n-genus topological manifolds and so on....
Where are all of the sparticles and bosinos that are supposed to
exist if SUSY is correct? Occam's razor keeps me from believing in them...
--
Onward!
Stephen
ROGER: Unlike Aristotle, Leibniz's monads do not assume that there is
just one (primitive) substance, contrary to what I imagine Bruno attacked.
The monads as I now see them are subjective entities that
refer to physical brain domains of one function. Being subjective,
they are beyond spacetime (are mental) but at the same time
they refer to functional domains of the brain (point to, are related to
the physical).So they seem to qualify as topics of functional brain
theory (functionalism).
As to causal effectiveness, the links between the monads and
the brain regions they refer to are not causal, as mind cannot
directly manipulate matter. Indirectly as monads they can,
however. The links are thus called "bridges" and belong to
bridging theories of mind.
Every monad is different functional, mental, substance, and they
are beginning to somewhat look like Whitehead's "occasions of experience",
although there are some important differences.
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