On Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 25 Nov 2012, at 19:39, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > OK, I think I may understand the issue of consciousness. > Comp is what the brain does in the flesh, > > > I see what you mean: the fleshy brain is supposed to do computation. > But the wording is a bit loose. By definition comp is the belief that [the > needed work done by the brain to make you consciousness present in our most > probable environment] can be done by a computer. > > > then > consciousness is a product of what the brain does . > > > Not really. That's the whole point. You can think like that in the begining > of the reasoning, but in fine, despite it is highly counter-intuitive, the > contrary happens to be the case. Brains, as material objects, do not exist. > They are a product of consciousness coupled to deep and long computations. > Don't take my word for it: this is really the conclusion of the reasoning. > You must for that accept, if only for the sake of the argument, the > definition of comp (which I call often step 0 on the list), then step 1, > step 2 up to step 7 and/or 8 to see what I mean by "the brain is a product > of consciousness". Note that I did not say that the brain is the product of > human consciousness: it is far more complex, and there are many open > problem, but they are translated in pure math, and they lead to an infinity > of experimental device description capable of testing comp. > > > > > Comp is associated to the brain, but not to consciousness at least directly. > > > It is really the contrary. Comp is a belief that consciousness is invariant > for some physical changes: > brain=>computer, and it leads to the idea that matter emerge from > consciousness, through the coherence (multi-consistence) of some numbers' > dream (computation "seen from inside", like with the 1p and 3p distinction). > > This is not well know, so you can take all your time and perhaps even find a > flaw. > > > > Is that right ? > > > Comp bet on a relation between brain and consciousness, but in fine it will > explains the physical structure of the brain through a theory of > consciousness, itself explains in term of number relation. > But please: don't try to understand this intuitively without getting > familiar with the UDA steps. It is really something that you have to > understand logically to give meaning to it. Comp is counter-intuitive, > provably so. > > Bruno > > > > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 11/25/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-25, 09:51:05 > Subject: Re: no thanks, doctor > > > On 24 Nov 2012, at 14:53, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > OK, I kept thinking that in comp, the computer calculations > had to do everything. > > > The phrasing is ambiguous. The computer calculations, or equivalently the > (sigma_1) arithmetical relation makes only virtual physics, and virtual > dreams of virtual physics, and the real physics is something emerging in the > mind of those dreaming entities. Note that with comp, dreams obeys very > strict mathematical laws. > > > > But you say that comp is not needed for > consciousness to occur. But that is an assumption. > > > I do not understand. > > Comp is just the hypothesis that the brain makes our consciousness > manifestable in virtue of emulating some programs. > > > > > > One would need an additional assumption, that consciousness > be the mediator in converting input physical sensory signals into > nonphysical mental sensations such as hotness. > > > In which theory? There is a sense that what you say is a consequence of > comp. Obvioulsy if you say "yes" to the doctor, you believe that the > brain-machine build by the doctor, from the scanning of your brain, will > indeed interface correctly your first person consciousness to that machine > and its environment. This is contained in the comp assumption, and this does > not need to postulate a fundamental physical world, or a fundamental > consciousness. At first it is better to be agnostic on this, so to see more > easily if the reasoning is valid or not. > > > > > > And for > consciousness to achieve the inverse output process, of converting a > nonphysical mental intention into a nerve signal for action. > > > And then, if you proceed step by step you will see that we don't have that > problem, as the physical has no ontology at all. It does not exist per se. > It is only dreamed by numbers. It emerges from the epistemology/theology of > the numbers. > > > > > Those assumptions are merely that-- assumptions. > > > Comp is an assumption, and it is rather equivalent with what you say to > paragraph above, but not with the one paragraph above. > All theories *are* assumptions. Consciousness is the only thing which can be > said not being an assumption (at least not a conscious one!), but it is not > a theory, it is an experience. > > > > So thanks, > doctor, but no thanks. Comp requires huge additional assumptions > to be uised in my case for a transplant. > > > This is incorrect. Non-comp is a stronger assumption. To make it you need to > speculate on something far more complex than whatever we know about brain > and universe. Likewise, to even make sense of it, you should tell us what > you think is not Turing emulable in the brain. > > Comp is so weak that Diderot defined rationalism by its ancestor mechanist > doctrine. > > Comp is phrased often by "no magic". It assumes the less, and then by UDA, > it gives the simple TOE. Any Turing complete formalism (any Turing universal > program, or system, etc.). And it explains constructively how to derive > theology including physics, from just 0, 1, 2, 3 ... together with the laws > of + and *. But you need to be familar with the first person indeterminacy > to get a feeling how that is possible. You might need also some more > knowledge of basic computer science, for the UD notion. > > And the theology is close to your intuition on Plato and Leibniz. So gain > your "no thanks" seems premature, and the reason you give is wrong as it > assumes less than any other theory (much less, as it do not assume a > primitive physical universe. > > Bruno > > > > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 11/24/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-24, 07:03:29 > Subject: Re: who is in control , you or the computer ? > > Hi Roger Clough, > > On 23 Nov 2012, at 18:18, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > I blow hot and cold about comp because I am not > really a theoretical thinker, I have to see how whatever works, > and I' stuck on US(1) as I do not know who is in control: > you or the computer ?. > > > You. the computer, or even the brain, is just a tool used by your > consciousness to manifest yourself in the environment. > > Brain and computer cannot, strictly speaking, think. Only person can think > and take initiative. Comp does not assume a computer can think (if computer > denotes the material machine), it assumes only that a computer can manifest > the complex number relations, or programs relations needed for your > consciousness to manifest itself in some environment. > > Feel free to ask any question (perhaps regrouped so as to avoid mailboxes > panic). > > Bruno > >
I have been concerned with the source of energy within comp.. Over on another list there is a fellow proposing that energy is conscious. http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/jcs-online/message/10646. It seems that he originally got this idea from the Seth channeled material. But nevertheless, the question on that basis that comes to my mind is: Within comp does physical energy arise as a result of consciousness? Here is a ref that says that work arises from entanglement: http://www.phys.ethz.ch/~dahlsten/entanglementintro.pdf Also I recently learned, I am ashamed to admit, that quantum information theory, which is based on complex numbers, allows for entropy to have negative values. Does comp also make that prediction? I am unable to find a ref for negative entropy in QIT. Richard > > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 11/23/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-23, 12:34:00 > Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence > > > On 23 Nov 2012, at 13:14, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > The problem is very basic and concerns at least UD(1). > I would call it the "what's next" problem. > > Suppose you say yes, doctor and then wake up after the > transplant of a computer for your brain. Everything feels > fine, there is is no problem to solve, you have no immediate goal, > so what do you do next ? > > > That is a funny question. I do not see at all the point. I guess that what I > do next will be the usual things. I will pay the doctor bill, and come back > to work, or take some rest, perhaps. The same question can be asked to > someone getting an artificial heart, or coming back from hospital for any > reason. > > UD-1, actually UD-0, is just the definition of comp: the idea that the brain > is a machine in the quasi-operational sense of accepting the transplant. > > Then UD-1 is do you accept that if UD-0 is correct (comp is true), then we > can in principle use classical teleportation (as described in the paper) as > a locomotion mean? > > Bruno > > > > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 11/23/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-22, 10:09:27 > Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence > > Hi Roger, > > > On 22 Nov 2012, at 13:57, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno > > Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence > between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with > the computer in order for comp to hold ? > > > You don't need a "perfect" correspondence. What would that mean? Even a > brain has to make a lot of approximate representations all of the time, and > to correct many error through redundant neuronal circuitry. > > > > > > > But that would require the computer to know the future. > Hence comp is false. > > > You seem to be quite quick. I am not sure I see your point at all. > > For comp being false, you need to postulate that there are some activities > which are not Turing emulable in the body, but up to now everything in > nature seems to be based on computable (Turing emulable) laws (except the > wave packet reduction, which is itself quite a speculation). > > Have you try to read the UD argument? Are you OK with the definition of > comp, and step 1? > > Bruno > > > > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 11/22/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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