On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 12:44 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
> itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
> theory has done.
>
>
> On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the
> the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand
> that physics emerge from the way the "numbers see themselves".
>
> But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness
> phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp & p definition. It is a
> bit technical.
>
> Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it
> plays the key role for consciousness and matter.
>
>
>
>
> We can replace [1p] by its actions -
> those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).
> You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.
>
>
> That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p,
> that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe
> the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary
> statistical relation at some level.
>
>
>
>
> That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
> interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
> Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find
> again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
> for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
> theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
> cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
> when living breathing humans are concerned.
>
>
> I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of
> comp. You have computer science.
>
>
>
> IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
> computer calculations from emulating the mind.
>
>
> The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of
> view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the
> comp hope, or the comp fear.
>
> Bruno
>
Why just 8? I would have expected every possible "person points pf view"
consistent with MWI. Richard
>
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/5/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12
> Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth
>
>
> On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual
> machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine
> (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not
> codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and
> reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and
> sensation).
>
> Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
> Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not
> codable.
> Many things true about us is not codable either.
>
>
> Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. that
> "p" describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a
> machine.
>
>
> No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2.
>
>
>
>
>
> That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit
> in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part
> of the state corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing point."
>
>
> Then Mars Rover is not L鯾ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is
> Turing universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality.
>
> But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic of a new
> 'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical
> proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it is
>
> Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2.
>
> We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need something like
> Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in general cannot defined in
> arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and study its logic, which obeys a
> soprt of temporal intuionistic logic (interpreting the S4Grz logic
> obtained).
>
>
>
>
>
> One could include such second-level states (which one might want to
> communicate to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another
> first-level state. Right?
>
>
> Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is in the
> "I believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to myself. The 1-I
> will be the non definable operator above. We connect the believer to the
> truth. It is easy to do for the sound correct machine.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
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